The Importance of Board Independence - a Multidisciplinary Approach
The Importance of Board Independence (IVOR nr. 90) 2012/1.4:1.4 Aim and relevance
The Importance of Board Independence (IVOR nr. 90) 2012/1.4
1.4 Aim and relevance
Documentgegevens:
N.J.M. van Zijl, datum 05-10-2012
- Datum
05-10-2012
- Auteur
N.J.M. van Zijl
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS599484:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht / Algemeen
Ondernemingsrecht / Corporate governance
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
The research design stresses the main advantage of this study as truly multidisciplinary research. It combines legal aspects, with economic and behavioural disciplines and answers the research questions from three approaches in order to acquire a broad overview of independence. It deals with a subject that has dominated corporate governance discussions for decades, but does not have a true definition and undisputed consequences. Therefore, this study is valuable for policymakers throughout Europe as well as Brussels. Additionally, society can benefit from this study. The investigated determinants and consequences of independence are relevant to boards of directors, management and supervisory boards, shareholders, bondholders, employees and other stakeholders.
In sum, the benefits of this study are as follows.
This research applies a truly multidisciplinary approach by combining economic, legal and behavioural aspects to understand independence of supervisors.
A meta-analysis of the most recent publications regarding board independence and company performance is conducted.
A comparison between three European legal systems regarding independence of supervisors is made.
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