Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
Einde inhoudsopgave
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.6.2.2:6.6.2.2 Cooperation in assessment of resolution objective ‘protection of public funds’
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.6.2.2
6.6.2.2 Cooperation in assessment of resolution objective ‘protection of public funds’
Documentgegevens:
M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS214007:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
SRB, Decision of 23 June 2017 concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., SRB/EES/2017/11, p. 18. SRB, Decision of 23 June 2017 concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A., SRB/EES/2017/12, p. 18.
The formal adoption is however envisaged for 2019 (SRB Annual Report 2019, p. 25).
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
In addition, it is not clear from the publicly available information if, and to what extent, information has been shared between the Commission and the SRB in respect of the intention of Italy to award State aid. For resolution to be in the ‘public interest’, it should be necessary for the achievement and be proportionate to one or more of the resolution objectives, and winding up of the bank in normal insolvency proceedings should not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent. One of the resolution objectives is to protect public funds by minimising reliance on EPFS. The assessment that is made by the SRB in relation to this objective in the cases of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca only refers to the use of deposit guarantee schemes. No reference is made to the State aid that Italy was about to award to the failing banks.1
The decisions of the SRB concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca were made on 23 June 2017. On 25 June 2017, the Commission approved the award of State aid by the Italian State. It seems very unlikely that the SRB was not informed by the Commission about Italy’s plans to award that State aid. But, if it was not informed about these plans, this should, in the author’s view, have led to the conclusion that it had insufficient information to make its assessment in relation to the fulfilment of the resolution conditions. In the author’s view, it is necessary for the SRB to be fully aware of the plans of the Member State so that it can include any considerations in that respect in its assessment of the resolution conditions. Its assessment in the cases of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca seems to be incomplete in that respect.
In order to ensure that the SRB is fully informed when it makes its assessment, it seems to be relevant to require that the Commission, as soon as it receives a (formal or informal) request for approval of a State aid award from a Member State, contacts the SRB. This could be part of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Commission and the SRB. Such notification obligation already rests on the SRB on the basis of Article 19(2) SRMR. At the time of writing this dissertation, no MoU between the SRB and the Commission was publicly available.2