Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
Einde inhoudsopgave
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/3.6.2:3.6.2 Cost allocation within a group
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/3.6.2
3.6.2 Cost allocation within a group
Documentgegevens:
mr. M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
mr. M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS213904:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
EC, 27 February 2008, C(2008)/ 711 def. (C9/2008 – SachsenLB), par. 64. Another example can be found in EC, 22 November 2006, C(2006)5427 final (C50/2006 – BAWAG-PSK), footnote 15.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
Under the 2004 R&R Guidelines, if a firm in difficulty formed part of a larger business group, it was only eligible for rescue and restructuring aid where it could be demonstrated that the firm's difficulties were intrinsic and were not the result of an arbitrary allocation of costs within the group, and that the difficulties were too serious to be dealt with by the group itself.
In the case of SachsenLB, for example, the Commission considered that the eligibility seemed not to be hampered by the fact that SachsenLB belonged to a group in the sense of point 13 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines, given that the difficulties were intrinsic and too serious to be dealt with by the group itself.1
The 2013 Banking Communication contains no similar condition.