State aid to banks
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State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/13.5.3:13.5.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/13.5.3
13.5.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
Documentgegevens:
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS591814:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 144-145.
KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 176.
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 244.
Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 129.
KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 173.
This characteristic could have been elaborated by other characteristics (that explain why it is easy to separate), but this is not done in the Commission decisions.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
Several observations can be made. First of all, the Commission usually refers to the market characteristics. For instance, in the decision on ING, the Commission considered that the carve-out of WUH/Interadvies should be able to add competition in the highly concentrated retail banking market in the Netherlands. The Commission also took into account the fact that ING was one of the market leaders.1 These two market characteristics reinforce the need for compensatory measures such as the divestment.
Second, the divestment business should constitute an attractive target. For instance, in the decision on the Belgian bank KBC, the Commission pointed out that Centea and Fidea – i.e. the entities that KBC had to divest – were “attractive targets for competitors wishing to enter the Belgian market, because Centea and Fidea have a well-established brand name and distribution networks”.2
Similarly, in the decision on Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the Commission considered the Rainbow Business – i.e. the entity that RBS had to divest – to be “a sufficiently attractive target for some competitors wishing to enter the UK market or expand their presence there”.3
The third observation concerns the feasibility of creating a viable standalone entity. It is of importance that the divested entity should be a viable standalone entity. In the decision on Dunfermline, the Commission remarked that Dunfermline was very small, since it had less than 40 branches. Consequently, the Commission concluded that it did not seem likely that a viable entity could be divested from it.4 So the fact that the beneficiary bank is very small has a negative impact on the feasibility of creating a new competitor. In the decision on KBC, the Commission noted that Centea and Fidea were relatively easy to separate from KBC’s Belgian business unit.5 The fact that the divestment business is relatively easy to separate has a positive impact on the feasibility of creating a viable standalone entity.6
The fourth observation concerns the divestment-related commitments. This observation merits some further discussion: see subsections 13.5.3.1 to 13.5.3.3.
13.5.3.1 Value preservation commitments13.5.3.2 Purchaser requirements13.5.3.3 An inconsistency?