State aid to banks
Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/12.9.1:12.9.1 Key findings
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/12.9.1
12.9.1 Key findings
Documentgegevens:
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS589432:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
Not all bank State aid cases are characterised by the same type of burden- sharing, nor are they characterised by the same level of burden-sharing. Indeed, as section 12.6 has shown, the subordinated creditors in some cases only faced a coupon ban, while in other cases, the subordinated debt was completely written- down. Does this amount to an inconsistency?
In my opinion, it does not amount to an inconsistency. In that regard, it should be recalled that an evolving policy does not mean that the principle of equal treatment is violated. As explained in section 6.7.3, I am of the opinion that the principle of equal treatment allows for policy changes. One of the most prominent policy changes was the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication. This Communication established clear burden-sharing standards. In the 2013 Banking Communication, the Commission explicitly referred to the level playing field. The Commission recognised that the absence of ex ante thresholds for burden-sharing had resulted in “diverging approaches to burden-sharing across Member States” and that this would risk undermining the level playing field. For that reason, the Commission decided to raise the minimum requirements for burden-sharing. Thus, the 2013 Banking Communication has contributed greatly to a consistent application of the burden-sharing principle. From that viewpoint, I welcome the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication.