The Importance of Board Independence - a Multidisciplinary Approach
Einde inhoudsopgave
The Importance of Board Independence (IVOR nr. 90) 2012/10.4.1:10.4.1 CEO duality
The Importance of Board Independence (IVOR nr. 90) 2012/10.4.1
10.4.1 CEO duality
Documentgegevens:
N.J.M. van Zijl, datum 05-10-2012
- Datum
05-10-2012
- Auteur
N.J.M. van Zijl
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS599516:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht / Algemeen
Ondernemingsrecht / Corporate governance
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
The UKCGC requires a separate CEO and chairman and recommends abandoning CEO duality. The Companies’ Act does not provide anything about the combination of the CEO and Chairman positions. In the Dutch dual board structure there is no overlap between members of the management board and the supervisory board, which makes it impossible to create a situation of CEO duality. The Civil Code and the DCGC do not allow CEO duality in the unitary board structure in the Netherlands. In Sweden, the SCCG as well as the Companies’ Act prohibit the combination of managing director and chairman.
(Consideration 10.6) The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden all prohibit the combination of the CEO and Chairman positions. However, in the United Kingdom only the UKCGC recommends abandoning it, which means that companies can choose to opt for CEO duality and explain their deviation from the UKCGC. The United Kingdom should reconsider this situation, because a prohibition of CEO duality is a very important precondition of independence.