State aid to banks
Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/13.13.1:13.13.1 Key findings
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/13.13.1
13.13.1 Key findings
Documentgegevens:
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS588265:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
The key findings concern the relevant context and the inconsistencies.
The relevant context
The Commission assesses whether the compensatory measures are sufficient to mitigate possible distortions of competition. As set out in the present chapter, the starting point of this assessment is the relevant context. The Commission does not use the term ‘context’, but it does take into account the fact that the bank is being wound-down (W-context), taken over by another bank (T-context) or split-up (S-context). In these contexts, the beneficiary bank disappears as a standalone entity. This is considered by the Commission as a significant compensatory measure.
Inconsistencies
This chapter has found several inconsistencies in the Commission’s decisional practice. The most conspicuous ones will be highlighted below.
In the first place, the present chapter has shown that two compensatory measures were required by the Commission in the early bank State aid cases. The Commission required a specific type of divestment, namely a divestment aimed at creating a new competitor. Furthermore, the Commission required that the beneficiary bank would be subject to a price leadership ban. As explained in sections 13.5 and 13.10, these two compensatory measures do not appear in later bank State aid cases. Does this constitute a change of approach? This could have been better explained or clarified by the Commission.
In the second place, the present chapter has shown that the balance sheet reduction is elaborated inconsistently. Firstly, the percentage of the balance sheet reduction is not always mentioned in combination with the relative aid amount. Secondly, in some decisions, the emphasis is on the way how the balance sheet reduction is achieved (i.e. which activities are divested), while in other decisions, the emphasis is on the percentage of the balance sheet reduction.
In the third place, the Commission did not always take into account the modal-ities of some behavioural restrictions. For instance, the present chapter has highlighted that the Commission always welcomed an acquisition ban, without taking into account the modalities of the acquisition ban – which, in my opinion, amounts to an inconsistency.