Einde inhoudsopgave
Judicial protection for banks under the Single Rulebook and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (LBF vol. 22) 2021/4.2.3.2
4.2.3.2 Downwards effect of a directive concerning state-owned banks
M.B.J. van Rijn, datum 01-09-2021
- Datum
01-09-2021
- Auteur
M.B.J. van Rijn
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS491323:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Financieel recht / Financieel toezicht (juridisch)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See e.g. Case C-188/89, Foster v British Gas, ECLI:EU:C:1990:313, paras. 18 and 20; Case C‑282/10, Dominguez, EU:C:2012:33, paras. 38 and 39.
Case C-425/12, Portgás, ECLI:EU:C:2013:829, paras. 34-38. It also useful to observe that, according to established case law, it is irrelevant, as to the possibility to directly rely upon a directive, whether an emanation of the State acted in the capacity as a public authority or a more private capacity, for instance as an employer. See Marshall I, para. 49.
See Kornezov (2017), p 273.
The Court’s broad definition of the term ‘State’ is criticised in the literature as an artificial construction to allow a broader application direct effect of directives. It would lead to an unlevel playing field between market participants, increases legal uncertainty, and the estoppel argument does not hold as it is not the responsibility of State-controlled undertakings to implement directives, nor are they even competent to do so. See Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-316/93, Nicole Vaneetveld v Le Foyer, ECLI:EU:C:1994:32, para. 31; Craig (2009), p 356. On the other hand, while the estoppel argument may not apply in full, the State could employ strategic non- or wrong-implementation of a directive to provide State-controlled entities, and thereby indirectly itself, with an advantage.
Case C-188/89, Foster v British Gas, ECLI:EU:C:1990:313 (Foster), para. 20.
See Case C‑413/15, Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2017:745 (Farrell), para. 29.
See Farrell, para. 34.
In Anisimovienė the Union Court concluded that the entity which guaranteed deposits and investments in the case of insolvency of an investment firm was:“[A] legal person governed by public law, so that it can without more be treated as comparable to the State for the purposes of the direct applicability of Directives 94/19 and 97/9.” Case C-688/15, Anisimovienė and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:209, para. 110.
See Foster, para. 20.
As Koutrakos observes:“There appears to be a whiff of “I recognise it when I see it” test in this approach. While far from ideal in terms of legal certainty, it is, nonetheless, difficult to envisage a different way of settling this issue.” See Koutrakos (2018), p 622.
See Farrell, para. 40.
See Case C-157/02, Rieser Internationale Transporte, ECLI:EU:C:2004:76, para. 27.
See Banks (2019), p 123.
See Case C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, ECLI:EU:C:2012:707, paras. 90-104.
The ban on downwards vertical effect of a directive applies only in relation to individuals. Hence, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and therefore cannot be relied upon against a person before a court. The rationale thereof is that a directive is only binding on the Member States and, therefore, its provisions can only be relied on against authorities of the Member State. Against this backdrop, it is important to consider what constitutes ‘authorities of the Member State’. Is a bank that is majority-owned by a Member State an ‘emanation of the State’?
Before analysing this question, it is important to note that the Union courts developed the doctrine of vertical direct effect of a directive to allow an individual to rely directly upon a directive against (an emanation of) the State.1 Here, however, the question is whether the ECB (or a national competent authority) can directly rely upon a directive against (an emanation of) the State. Important, in this regard, is Portgas, in which the Union Court affirmed that the authorities of the Member States must be in a position to ensure that emanations of the State comply with the provisions of a directive. Hence, the authorities of a Member State may rely directly upon a directive, which is sufficiently clear and precise, against an emanation of the State.2 Considering that the duty to comply with a directive is binding on all emanations of the Member State and that other public authorities may therefore rely directly upon a directive against emanations of the State, it seems fair to conclude that the ECB could also rely directly upon a directive vis-à-vis an emanation of the State.3
Against this backdrop, it becomes all the more important to consider what exactly constitutes an emanation of the State. From the case law, it is clear that the Union courts employ a broad understanding of what constitutes an authority of the Member State to allow a person to rely upon a directive directly against such an ‘authority’.4 This is, of course, subject to the condition that the provision of the directive is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, and the transposition period has expired. Not only do such authorities include the public administration exercising sovereign powers, but it also includes other entities which qualify as an emanation of the State. In Foster, the Union Court held that an emanation of the State encompasses:
“[A] body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals is included in any event among the bodies against which the provisions of a directive capable of having direct effect may be relied upon.”5
Recent case law clarified that the conditions presented in Foster are not cumulative.6 It follows that an organisation or body, even one governed by private law, is an emanation of the State if it meets any one of the following criteria:
It is a legal person governed by public law that is part of the State in the broad sense.
It is subject to the authority or control of a public body.
It is required by the State to perform a task in the public interest and, for that purpose, has been given special powers.7
It seems unlikely that a bank would meet the first condition as they are established under private law and cannot be considered part of the State.8 The requirement of ‘special powers’, under the third condition, means powers “beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals”.9 The exact content of such ‘special powers’ remains somewhat unsure. 10 The Union courts recognised special powers inter alia when national law required compulsory membership to an insurance undertaking,11 and when it entrusted a company with the construction and operation, including levying tolls, of motorways.12
In order to qualify a State-owned bank as an emanation of the State, the second criterium is the most promising. According to this criterium, an entity that falls under the authority or control of a public body qualifies as an emanation of the State. This implies that the ECB may rely directly upon a directive against a bank “which is owned or otherwise controlled by the State”.13 It will be for the Union courts to determine when a bank is controlled by the State. However, drawing a connection with the distinction between the free movement of capital and the right of establishment, it seems likely that State control would imply the power to exercise a definite influence over the bank’s decisions and to determine its activities.14 As such, State control implies a controlling power that goes beyond a passive investment acquired solely to make a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the bank.