Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/7.4.2
7.4.2 Concluding remarks
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS590563:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
One of these cases is the case of ING, which was discussed in depth in section 5.2. Other examples are: BPN, 2012, para. 65; the Irish guarantee scheme, para. 36-37.
The impact of the position of the Member State on the extensiveness of the Commission’s assessment can be illustrated by the following recital from the decision on the French refinancing scheme: “France rejects the classification of the notified scheme as State aid and the Commission must therefore carry out a detailed analysis of the classification.” (N548/08, para. 54)
In many bank State aid cases, it is more or less straightforward that the State did not act as a private investor. There are therefore many decisions in which the Commission limited itself to the observation that under the then-current market conditions, a market economy investor would not be willing to grant such a measure on a comparable scale and on similar terms.
Sometimes, a Member State argues that it acted in line with the MEOP.1 In these cases, the Commission has to assess (in its decision) whether the MEOP is met. By contrast, when a Member State recognises that the aid measure constitutes State aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU, then there is less need for the Commission to dwell on the MEOP.2