Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
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Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.6.2:6.6.2 Tension between the different roles
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.6.2
6.6.2 Tension between the different roles
Documentgegevens:
M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS213890:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
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There can be certain tensions between the different roles that the Commission fulfils, since, on the one hand it is involved in the decision to put a bank in resolution – thereby restricting the access to EPFS – , while on the other hand it has to assess the compatibility of proposed State aid measures with the internal market.
The tension between the different roles of the Commission became clear in the cases of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca. In these cases, the SRB concluded that resolution was not in the public interest; the banks were put in liquidation instead. In order to ensure that this liquidation took place in an orderly manner, State aid was awarded by the Italian State, involving cash injections of about EUR 4.785 billion and State guarantees of a maximum of about EUR 12 billion.1 This State aid was assessed by the Commission under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU following the statement of the Italian authorities that “it would not be possible to avoid a serious disturbance in the economy in the areas where VB and BPVI operate with a particular impact on interruption of SME's business activities and lending to households.”2 This course of action has been criticized in the literature.3 In particular, it is not understood why resolution is not in the public interest, while the award of State aid is subsequently justified to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. A few remarks can be made in that respect.
6.6.2.1 Commission cannot endorse assessment of resolution conditions6.6.2.2 Cooperation in assessment of resolution objective ‘protection of public funds’6.6.2.3 Retail investor protection may be underlying rationale for decisions6.6.2.4 Resolution and State aid control may serve different purposes6.6.2.5 Distinction between DG COMP and DG FISMA