Einde inhoudsopgave
Female representation at the corporate top (IVOR nr. 126) 2022/3.5
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
dr. mr. R.A. van ’t Foort-Diepeveen , datum 13-05-2022
- Datum
13-05-2022
- Auteur
dr. mr. R.A. van ’t Foort-Diepeveen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS659225:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Ondernemingsrecht / Corporate governance
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Lennarts, in: Diversiteit. Een multidisciplinaire terreinverkenning, 2020, p. 179; Wyckaert, in: Diversiteit. Een multidisciplinaire terreinverkenning, 2020, p. 431; Perquin-Deelen, Biases in de boardroom en de raadkamer, 2020a, p. 118; Mooijman, De Standaard 5 February 2021.
Pouwels & van den Brink, Zonder wet geen voortgang: Bedrijvenmonitor Topvrouwen 2020, 2021, p. 91, 99 and 100.
Pouwels & van den Brink, Zonder wet geen voortgang: Bedrijvenmonitor Topvrouwen 2020, 2021, p. 100.
Wyckaert, in: Diversiteit. Een multidisciplinaire terreinverkenning, 2020, p. 433.
Although it is a bit too early to say whether the Belgian quota has succeeded in realizing one-third women on boards, research indicates that the quota has had a positive effect.1 Between 2008 and 2017, the number of women appointed to management boards of Belgian listed companies increased substantially. However, it is still not clear whether all companies have succeeded in meeting the percentage of one-third women on their board.
It appears that the legislative proposal for mandatory quota in the Netherlands has already influenced the number of women on boards. The percentage of listed companies that achieved 30 percent women in both their management and supervisory boards rose by more than 9 percent between 2019 and 2020; faster than the years before. This was also acknowledged in the Bedrijvenmonitor 2020.2 However, the conclusions of the Bedrijvenmonitor 2020 also show that the listed companies that did not have to comply with the former target figure because they were not considered large companies but to which the proposed quota law is now going to apply, have not yet shown progress in the number of women on their boards. A large majority of these companies did not have any women on the supervisory board and/or management board mid-2020.3
For the Netherlands, the author expects – in contrast to the previous target figure legislation – that more results will be achieved following the introduction of the proposed quota legislation, especially now that sanctions are going to be put in place for non-compliance. However, the proposed quota is still too conservative. The proposed quota only applies to the supervisory board and not to the management board nor the executive committee. As in Belgium, the quota is shown only to have had an effect on the positions to which it specifically applies, and not on other positions.4 In light hereof, it is doubtful whether the number of women on management boards will increase in the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the Dutch proposed appropriate and ambitious target requirement is very similar to the former target figure, albeit that the target in the proposed legislation has to be more specific and leaves companies to decide on an appropriate and ambitious target for their company instead of applying a fixed target figure of 30 percent. Companies were given seven years (from January 2013 to January 2020) to meet the former target figure of 30 percent. Nonetheless, only a small group of companies managed to do so and to achieve 30 percent women on their boards. This indicates that the Dutch target figure did not work in practice. It is actually incomprehensible, therefore, why the Dutch government has again opted for a target figure. On what grounds is it assumed by the legislator that companies will now succeed in making their top more diverse? The proposed legislation still leaves companies a lot of room for formulating an ‘ambitious’ target figure. Clearer objectives should be set, and some direction should be given as to what ‘appropriate and ambitious’ entail. Moreover, it is questionable whether any form of target figure will lead to progress if it is not supported by effective sanctions in case of non-compliance.
To conclude, and in answer to the research question, the proposed gender quota could be an effective means of increasing the number of women on Dutch boards, as Belgium has illustrated. The Belgian approach to gender quota has shown us that the proposed Dutch quota is likely to have an effect, now that similar sanctions to the Belgian quota have been put in place. The proposed gender quota, therefore, gives grounds for optimism. By the same token, however, progress is expected to be limited to an increased number of women on supervisory boards only. As the Belgium quota law has shown, only those positions to which the quota explicitly applied increased towards the intended percentage. The Dutch legislator can, therefore, learn from the Belgian quota legislation, that the quota will most likely only bring about change for supervisory boards and not for management boards.