Einde inhoudsopgave
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.2.3
6.2.3 Another role for the Commission in the resolution process?
M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS214071:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Article 18(7), last paragraph SRMR. Article 44(12) BRRD. Article 18(7), last paragraph SRMR does not explicitly requires a notification to the Commission. However, it is the author’s understanding that such notification will have to take place in order to enable the Commission to make its assessment.
But only, if the requirements of Article 44 BBRD – or Article 27 SRMR – and the delegated act adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 44(11) BRRD are not met (Article 44(12) BRRD).
Article 18(7) SRMR. Article 44(12) BRRD also refers to Article 44 BRRD and the delegated act. It does however not require the Commission to set out adequate reasons.
Article 44(12) BRRD.
When a resolution authority (the SRB or the national resolution authority) decides to (partially) exclude certain liabilities from the application of the bail-in tool, it has to notify the Commission.1 If this requires a contribution by the SRF, national resolution fund, or an alternative financing source, the Commission may prohibit or require amendments to the proposed exclusion in order to protect the integrity of the internal market.2 Under the SRMR, it is specified that such a decision by the Commission has to set out adequate reasons based on an infringement of the requirements laid down in Article 27 SRMR and in the delegated act adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 44(11) BRRD.3 This is without prejudice to the assessment by the Commission under the State aid regime.4
This assessment is hence not part of the State aid assessment conducted by the Commission in its role as State aid authority. It however seems that this assessment is also not made by the Commission in its role as co-resolution authority, since the BRRD also provides for the Commission to conduct this assessment.5 One could argue that this assessment should be seen as an assessment on compliance with intrinsically linked provisions of the resolution framework, as this relates to aid measures granted by Member States or the SRF, in relation to which the Commission exercises an analogue form of State aid control, as further discussed in section 6.4.6.1. It seems however to be a more far-reaching power, since the Commission may also prohibit or require amendments to the exclusion proposed by the resolution authority.