EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation: from ISD to MiFID II
Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.II.3:8.II.3 Concluding remarks
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.II.3
8.II.3 Concluding remarks
Documentgegevens:
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS267324:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
In drafting MiFID I the Commission noted that fragmentation risks could arise ‘both inter-exchange’, as well as in relation to ‘exchanges and other types of order-execution venue’ (Commission, MiFID I Proposal, 19 October 2002(COM(2002) 625 final), p. 69).
Recital 5 MiFID I Implementing Regulation.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
MiFID I covered a similar equity post-trade transparency regime for RMs and MTFs. The MiFID I equity post-trade transparency regime for RMs and MTFs were part of the broader MiFID I framework to promote competition between order-execution platforms. On the one hand, a high degree of post-trade transparency was seen as essential to ensure a level playing field and to mitigate fragmentation risks, such as a hampered price discovery process.1 On the other hand, MiFID I recognized that deferral of post-trade publication is important to preserve liquidity. MiFID I permitted RMs and MTFs to have in place deferred publication arrangements. Where the MiFID I conditions were met, RMs and MTFs could defer the publication of post-trade information. The aim here was to enable investment firms involved in a ‘large in scale’-transaction to lay off their positions risks (rebalance inventory risks).2
The MiFID I post-trade transparency approach was fairly top-down. MiFID I intended to leave little flexibility as to the post-trade transparency that RMs and MTFs needed to publish. To achieve this result, highly harmonised rules were introduced. The framework directive (MiFID I Directive) provided the general post-trade transparency rules, which were supported by a directly applicable regulation (MiFID I Implementing Regulation). The amount of detail and directly applicable rules had the intention to ensure similar post-trade transparency publication across RMs and MTFs in the EEA.
Despite the top-down approach, MiFID I still left flexibility when it came to post-trade transparency publication by RMs and MTFs. First of all, the MiFID I post-trade transparency rules were limited to shares admitted to trading on an RM. Member States were permitted to expand the scope of the post-trade transparency rules, but this was not mandated. Second, the post-trade transparency obligations (not: deferral) were minimum harmonised. Member States were permitted to lay down stricter rules than those laid down by MiFID I (the wording ‘at least’ was used). Third, the NCAs (not: an EU institution) retained the final responsibility for granting deferral arrangements.