Einde inhoudsopgave
Remedies for infringements of EU law in legal relationships between private parties (LBF vol. 18) 2019/3.3.4.1
3.3.4.1 A first ground for liability: Article 56 TFEU
mr. I.V. Aronstein, datum 01-09-2019
- Datum
01-09-2019
- Auteur
mr. I.V. Aronstein
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS141444:1
- Vakgebied(en)
EU-recht / Algemeen
Burgerlijk procesrecht / Algemeen
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Translated judgment Arbetsdomstolen, pp. 246-248. The Arbetsdomstolen refers also to para. 98 of the Court’s judgment as well as to CJ 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05 (Viking).
CJ 17 July 2008, Case C-94/07 (Raccanelli) on Article 45 TFEU confirming once more CJ 12 December 1974, Case 36/74 (Walrave and Koch), CJ 15 December 1995, Case C-415/93 (Bosman) and CJ 6 June 2000, Case C-281/98 (Angonese).
Translated judgment Arbetsdomstolen, pp. 248-249, with reference to Raccanelli, a case about the free movement of persons.
Ibid., at p. 249.
Note that the translated judgment (erroneously) states that the violation must be “sufficiently clear”. I recall that direct vertical effect and State liability are distinct concepts with different objectives and consequences (see §2.1.1). For a provision to have direct effect it must be sufficiently clear. This is however not a condition for State liability. Supposedly what was meant was that the violation was “sufficiently serious”. See CJ 5 March 1996, Joined Cases C‑‑46/93 and C‑‑48/93 (Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III), para. 51.
Ibid., p. 249. For an extensive elaboration on these criteria see Sieburgh 2014b, especially at pp. 489-518.
Translated judgment Arbetsdomstolen, p. 249.
See remark in footnote 284.
Translated judgment Arbetsdomstolen, p. 250. See also the dissenting opinions of Judge Öman, Judge Eriksson and Judge Olovsson to the judgment of the Arbetsdomstolen. They disagree with the liability on the basis of Article 56 TFEU.
112. Despite the fact that both parties to the conflict had requested the Swedish court to refer new preliminary questions – this time concerning the potential liability of the trade unions in relation to their infringement of Article 56 TFEU – the Arbetsdomstolen decides to make its own appraisal. In order to answer the question of whether an infringement of the Treaty by a private party vis-à-vis another private party can lead to liability to pay damages, the Arbetsdomstolen phrases a series of questions that serve as prerequisites of the imposition of liability to pay damages: 1) Does Article 56 TFEU have direct horizontal effect so that it can serve as a ground for liability?; 2) Should the remedy for a violation of Article 56 TFEU be the compensation for damages?; and 3) Which liability rules are applicable to liability for a violation of Article 56 TFEU?
113. As concerns the first question, the Arbetsdomstolen compares the French, German, Swedish, English, and Danish versions of the Court of Justice’s ruling and concludes that, indeed, not only the regulatory or norm-giving operations of trade unions are encompassed by Union law, but also their concrete actions. Thus, concludes the Arbetsdomstolen, Article 56 TFEU imposes rights and obligations upon private parties and can be invoked as such. Consequently, the trade unions are liable for having violated Laval’s right to provide services in Sweden.1
Subsequently, the Arbetsdomstolen connects the principle of sincere cooperation, the principle of effectiveness and the Court of Justice’s judgment in Raccanelli.2 The Arbetsdomstolen acknowledges that Raccanelli does not concern Article 56 TFEU. Nevertheless, taking that ruling as a source of inspiration, the Arbetsdomstolen holds that “there is a general principle within [EU] law that damages are also to be able to be awarded between private parties upon a violation of a treaty provision that has horizontal direct effect”, not only in the realm of competition law, but also with respect to violations of other Treaty provisions.3
114. According to the Arbetsdomstolen, the trade unions should be equated with Member States when it comes to the assessment of their liability to pay damages for infringements of Union law. The equation is based on the legal autonomy, authority and societal interests of the trade unions. Or as the Arbetsdomstolen puts it: “it can be seen as odd to make a distinction”.4 In other words, the trade union’s liability for damages should be established on the basis of the three criteria for State liability. That is, 1) the rule violated intended to create rights for private parties; 2) the violation is sufficiently serious5; and 3) there is a direct causal link between the violation and the damage suffered by the private party.6 The Arbetsdomstolen analogously applies these criteria to the case at hand. Brief and to the point the court ticks off the first and the third criterion: Article 56 TFEU confers rights upon private parties and has direct horizontal effect, and there is causality between the violation and the harm suffered by Laval.7 With regard to the second criterion, the Arbetsdomstolen is of the opinion that the collective actions at issue constitute serious violations of Article 56 TFEU, a “fundamental principle in the Treaty”. The Arbetsdomstolen proceeds by giving insight into its balancing process by stating:
“Even if the right to take industrial action has also been recognised by the European Community as a fundamental right, it was found that the actual industrial actions, despite their objective of protecting workers, are not acceptable as they were not proportionate. The Arbetsdomstolen finds that the stance of the European Court of Justice in these issues entails in this case that there is a violation if EC law that is sufficiently clear8. The requisites for damage liability exist therewith.”9
In conclusion, the Arbetsdomstolen takes the principle of sincere cooperation and the principle of effectiveness as a point of departure, and arrives, via the analogous application of the criteria for Member State liability, to the conclusion that the trade unions are liable to pay damages on the basis of Article 56 TFEU. Another outcome would, according to the Arbetsdomstolen, jeopardise the effet utile of Union law.