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Prudential regulation of investment firms in the European Union (ZIFO nr. 32) 2021/5.1
5.1 IOSCO objectives and principles of securities regulation
mr. drs. B.J. Nieuwenhuijzen, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. drs. B.J. Nieuwenhuijzen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS262365:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Financieel toezicht (juridisch)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
The objectives and principles as defined by IOSCO have no legal status and they do not oblige specific countries to amend national legislation. The reports of IOSCO are the result of research and study by the specific experts of the member countries. As such, member countries strive to adhere to the outcomes and conclusions of IOSCO reports. As these reports are written by experts on the respective topics, they provide a basis on which the scientific discussion of this study can be (partly) built.
See IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 1998 (the 1998 IOSCO Principles).
See the 1998 IOSCO Principles, page 1.
See the 1998 IOSCO Principles, page 1.
See the 1989 IOSCO report, page 10.
See the 1989 IOSCO report, page 5.
See the 1989 IOSCO report, page 10.
See the 1998 IOSCO Principles, paragraph 4.
See the 1998 IOSCO Principles, paragraph 12.2
See the 1998 IOSCO Principles, paragraph 12.4
Prudential supervision focuses on the financial aspects of a firm. Does the firm comply with the capital requirements, own funds requirements, liquidity requirements or the governance requirements specific to the (financially) sound management of a firm. Firms can also be subjected to “market conduct” supervision, which focuses on the behaviour of a financial firm on financial markets or towards the customers of the firm.
Moloney (2014), page 320.
Moloney (2014), page 320.
Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECRE I- 1141, para 42.
See also page 296 of Moloney, N., ‘EC Securities Regulation’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002 (Moloney (2002).
See for instance: PWC, ‘Asset Management 2020: A brave new world’, 2014, available at www.pwc.com/assetmanagement, or: PWC, ‘Asset Management 2020 and beyond: Transforming your business for a new global tax world’, 2015, available at www.pwc.com/amtax2020.
See IOSCO, ‘A comparison and analysis of the prudential standards in the securities sector’, FR02/2015, February 2015 (the 2015 IOSCO report), which shows the prudential framework for investment firms in various countries. Table 1 of this report shows the various prudential frameworks.
See: (1) Paragraph 7 on page 2 of Basel I, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basle Capital Accord: international convergence of capital measurement and capital standards’, July 1988, updated to April 1998. (2) Paragraph 9 on page 3 of Basel II, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards A Revised Framework·, November 2005. Although Basel III does not explicitly state that its scope is internationally active banks, certain wordings do imply a similar scoping as Basel I and Basel II, see for instance Paragraph 12 on page 3 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’, December 2010 (rev June 2011).
See The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’, December 2010, rev June 2011.
193. In 1998 IOSCO published its objectives and principles1 of securities regulation2 in which it stated that “securities and derivatives markets are vital to the growth, development and strength of market economies”.3 As the importance of securities and derivatives markets increases, “securities markets have become central to individual wealth and retirement planning”.4 As such, firms active on these securities markets should be subject to certain requirements to “foster confidence in the financial markets”.5 In 1989 IOSCO published a report stating the need for “a common conceptual framework regarding capital requirements for [investment firms]”.6 This report, although published in 1989, is still relevant, as it was the starting point for the work done on a global level to define the objectives and principles in the 1998 IOSCO report. Even though these objectives and principles were established in 1989, these main objectives of supervision have remained the same. The way these principles have been applied in the specific capital regimes has changed as a result of the ongoing development of financial markets or the impact of financial crises. This has not, however, changed the rationale for imposing capital requirements in the first place. According to IOSCO the “efficient functioning of the financial markets requires members of the financial community to have confidence in each other’s stability and ability to transact business responsibly. This, in turn, requires each member of the financial community to have, among other things, adequate capital”.7 Furthermore, IOSCO saw capital adequacy rules as a means for investment firms to show commitment to their business and thereby contribute to confidence in the financial system.
194. Securities regulation, or the regulation of firms active in the securities markets, should be designed around three objectives: “(1) the protection of investors; (2) ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and (3) the reduction of systemic risk”.8 These objectives are also endorsed by IOSCO and as such from the basis of the various national prudential regimes for investment firms. Furthermore, regulation for various types of intermediaries or investment firms “should address entry criteria, capital and prudential requirements, ongoing supervision and discipline of entrants, and the consequences of default and financial failure. The oversight of market intermediaries should primarily be directed to the areas where their capital, client money and public confidence may most be put at risk”.9 The reasons for prudential supervision of investment firms are specified by IOSCO as follows:
“The protection of investors and stability of financial systems are increased by an adequate supervision of ongoing capital standards. Capital adequacy standards foster confidence in the financial markets and should be designed to allow a firm to absorb some losses, particularly in the event of large adverse market moves, and to achieve an environment in which an [investment firm] could wind down its business over a relatively short period without loss to its customers or the customers of other firms and without disrupting the orderly functioning of the financial markets. Capital standards should be designed to provide supervisory authorities with time to intervene to accomplish the objective of orderly wind-down. A firm should ensure that it maintains adequate financial resources to meet its business commitments and to withstand the risks to which its business is subject. Risk may result from the activities of unlicensed and off-balance sheet affiliates and regulation should consider the need for information about the activities of these affiliates. A capital adequacy test should address the risks faced by [investment firms] judged by reference to the nature and amount of the business undertaken by the firm.”10
195. The way prudential supervision11 of investment firms should be designed, when considering the 1989 and 1998 reports of IOSCO, therefore directly affects the confidence investors have in the market as a whole and the way individual firms can overcome financial distress. The above-mentioned reasons and objectives for prudential supervision of investment firms can be translated into two ‘goals’ for prudential supervision: (1) the financial stability and continuity of the investment firm and thus ensuring the continuing provision of this investment firm’s services for its clients; (2) reducing the impact of the failure of a single investment firm or the failure of a group of investment firms on the financial markets as a whole. These two goals of prudential supervision are important to keep in mind when identifying the types of prudential risk to which an investment firm can be exposed. Whereas some (prudential) risks directly affect the firm itself, other (prudential) risks might have a more profound impact on the market or its functioning.
196. With regard to the goals that prudential supervision of investment firms should achieve, it is important to note that “[…] the intermediation function (or investment services) provided by investment intermediaries [or investment firms] – […] plays a critical role in the financial markets by providing market access channels for capital providers and for capital seekers”.12 Investment firms facilitate market access for firms seeking capital. As such, firms without direct access to financial markets – and thus without direct access to capital – can enter the financial market through an investment firm. Investment firms facilitate this access either by providing a trading platform or by underwriting the placement of new financial instruments. Investments firms can also support liquidity in financial markets by being active as market makers or dealers on own account.
197. Investment firms can also provide services for those persons or firms that can provide capital and are thus seeking a financial return on their investment. “By providing services such as investment advice, discretionary asset management and brokerage services, and by acting as distribution channels for investment products, investment intermediaries act as a bridge between capital providers and the financial markets.”13 Investment firms, therefore, provide a valuable service for the financial markets which warrants adequate supervision, as recognized by the European Court of Justice in the Case of Alpine Investments,14 where it found that “the existence of professional regulations serving to ensure the competence and trustworthiness of the financial intermediaries on whom investors are particularly reliant was critical to ensure investor confidence in the securities markets”.15
198. Investment firms can provide certain critical functions in the global financial markets as brokers or as operators of trading platforms, but they can also provide valuable services for clients as asset managers. As the total amount of asset managed globally has seen a constant rise over the last decade,16 the risk that clients or counterparties of investment firms will be directly affected by the failure of an investment firm is thus increasing. Adequate prudential regulation of investment firms is essential to ensure that supervisory authorities have the appropriate tools to address these investment firms’ risk profile. The principles of securities regulation as established by IOSCO laid the basis for a first step towards harmonizing the prudential regulation of investment firms globally. The members of IOSCO, however, have implemented these principles of securities regulation in various forms. The European Union is nevertheless the only jurisdiction17 where the prudential principles that were designed for internationally active banks18 have been applied to all investment firms active in the European sector.19 Besides the EU, only Australia, Singapore and Japan apply a Basel or equivalent system to a subset of the investment firm sector. Al other countries included in the 2015 IOSCO report have a prudential framework based on the “net capital rule”, a concept that will be further explored in this Chapter.