Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/3.4.2
3.4.2 What is special about the Crisis Framework?
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS587007:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Not all authors agree with the specificity of the banking sector. For instance, D’sa (2009, p. 144) questions the specificity of the banking sector (and thus the need to create a special framework).
Mamdani 2012, p. 242; Botta (2016, p. 269) describes how in 2008 the French president Sarkozy put forward a proposal to exempt crisis aids form the scope of State aid control. Since unanimity was required and not all Member States agreed, this proposal was not accepted.
Da Silva & Sansom 2009, p. 31. See also: Gebski 2009, p. 95; Reynolds, Macrory & Chowdhury 2011, p. 1679.
On 31 July 2014, the Commission adopted the “Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty”. As the name suggests, these R&R- Guidelines do not apply to financial institutions. This is because financial institutions are covered by specific rules, i.e. the 2013 Banking Communication and the other Crisis Communications.
In some decisions, the Commission has made an effort to explain why a deviation of the R&R-Guidelines was needed. See for instance the decision in case WestLB, C43/2008,12 May 2009, para 63: “However, the nature and the scale of the present crisis call for further specific elements related to the current market conditions to be taken into account. Therefore the principles of the R&R Guidelines have to be modulated when applied to the restructuring of WestLB in the present crisis.”
Nicolaides & Rusu 2010, p. 767.
Lo Schiavo 2013, p. 142.
Nicolaides & Rusu 2010, p. 768.
Flynn 2014, p. 670.
This principle is reiterated in points 16 and 27 of the Restructuring Communication. Point 16 reads as follows: “Should further aid not initially foreseen in the notified restructuring plan be necessary during the restructuring period for the restoration of viability, this will be subject to individual ex ante notification and any such further aid will be taken into account in the Commission’s final decision.” However, this does not rule out the possibility to grant emergency aid prior to the notification of an amended restructuring plan. This is the case when urgent remedial action is needed to keep the ailing bank afloat. See for instance: WestLB, 7 October 2009. The Commission considered that in such cases a commitment to provide an amended restructuring plan within six months or less should be sufficient.
Point 15 of the Restructuring Communication.
See footnote 2 of point 15 of the Restructuring Communication.
Doleys 2012, p. 556.
See point 30 of the 2004 R&R-guidelines.
In essence, there are three moments: i) the moment of notification of the aid measures to the Commission, ii) the moment of authorization of the aid measures by the Commission, and iii) the moment of implementation of the aid measures. Ideally, the moment of implementation should be after the moment of authorization. However, in several cases, Member States have implemented the aid measures before gaining authorization by the Commission. This constitutes a breach of article 108(3) TFEU.
Point 53 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
Ahlborn & Piccinin 2010b, p. 140.
The Crisis Framework is special in the sense that it takes into account the specificities of the banking sector. By contrast, the Rescue and Restructuring- guidelines (R&R-guidelines) – that the Commission originally applied – do not take into account the systemic effects of a bank failure. As was explained in section 3.2, bank failure can be contagious. During the crisis, Member States supported banks not just to rescue one bank, but to rescue the entire banking sector. This makes the State aid to banks different from ‘normal’ rescue and restructuring aid.1 For this reason, the Commission adopted the Crisis Framework.
The adoption of the Crisis Framework is special in two ways. On the one hand, the introduction of the Crisis Framework underlined that the Commission continued to apply State aid rules to the banking sector. It had been argued by some that State aid control should be suspended altogether for the duration of the crisis.2 However, instead of completely suspending the State aid rules, the Commission adapted the State aid rules for the banking sector. It has been remarked that “the pragmatism and flexibility shown by the Commission in adjusting its approach to fit the circumstances may well have avoided a more serious undermining of State aid antitrust law through widespread non-compliance”.3
On the other hand, the adoption of the Crisis Framework constitutes a relaxation of the State aid rules. Although the Crisis Framework is largely based on the principles of the 2004 R&R-guidelines4, there are several differences between them.5 In that regard, the Crisis Communications have been described as “quite permissive”6, “more flexible”7, “accommodating”8 and a “marked liberalization”.9 The Crisis Communications are more flexible than the 2004 R&R-guidelines on the following aspects:
The “one time, last time principle”
Point 72 of the R&R-guidelines provides that rescue aid should only be granted once. This is known as the “one time, last time-principle”. In the crisis framework, the Commission departed from this “one time, last time-principle”. Point 7 of the Restructuring Communication stipulates that provision of additional aid during the restructuring period should remain a possibility if justified by reasons of financial stability.10 As a consequence, a bank can be aided several times.
The own contribution
The Commission requires a significant own contribution from the beneficiary bank. The R&R-guidelines contain several thresholds: for small enterprises, the contribution should be at least 25%; for SME, the contribution should be at least 40%; and for large firms, the contribution should be at least 50%. As banks are large firms, the R&R-guidelines would require an own contribution of at least 50%. Unlike the R&R-guidelines, the Crisis Framework does not stipulate a specific threshold for the own contribution.
The restructuring period
Another relaxation concerns the timeframe. In the Crisis Framework, the restructuring period (i.e. the period in which a bank has to return to viability) is extended to five years.11 This is a relaxation, because the normal time frame is two to three years.12
State aid procedure
The Crisis Framework not only amounted to substantive changes, it also changed the procedure.13 Under the R&R-guidelines, the Member States could not implement the aid measures until the Commission had approved the aid measures. The aid measures were subject to a full ex ante review. This process could take some time (usually several months). The R&R-guidelines provided for a simplified procedure14, but even this procedure could take 1 month. In a financial crisis, it is of the utmost importance that Member State can act quickly.15 The need for immediate approval of State aid measures was recognised by the Commission. Indeed, the 2008 Banking Communication stressed that “the Commission has taken appropriate steps to ensure the swift adoption of decisions upon complete notification, if necessary within 24 hours and over a weekend”.16 As set out in the previous subsection, the procedure (under the 2008 Banking Communication) was as follows: recapitalisation measures and asset relief measures were temporarily approved as rescue aid, while the in-depth analysis of the aid measures was postponed to the restructuring stage. This approach has been described as “clear first, ask questions later”.17