Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/3.2.2
3.2.2 Why banks are special
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS584729:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 25; Vickers Interim Report 2011, p. 64.
Quigley 2012, p. 2.
This will be discussed in more detail in section 7.6.
See, for instance: Beck et al. 2010, p. 11.
See, for instance: Savvides & Antoniou 2009, p. 348; Hellwig 2009, p. 182.
These reasons are not only discussed in the literature on (bank) State aid, but can also be found in the literature on financial regulation (as the rationale for financial regulation is related to the fact that bank failure is contagious). See, for instance: Brunnermeier et al. 2009, p. 3-5.
Beck et al. 2010, p. 11; Amelio & Siotis 2009, p. 4.
Hellwig 2009, p. 182.
Beck et al. 2010, p. 12; Heremans & Pacces 2012, p. 573; Lyons & Zhu 2011, p. 3; Maes & Kiljanski 2009, p. 13; Schooner & Taylor 2010, p. 42-45.
With respect to the first situation, it has been remarked that the public does not differentiate adequately among individual banks. See: Psaroudakis 2012, p. 198.
This form of contagion is sometimes referred to as “information(al) contagion”. See, for instance: Beck et al. 2010, p. 11; Brunnermeier et al. 2009, p. 3; Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 25; Hellwig 2009, p. 182.
Bovenzi, Guynn & Jackson 2013, p. 38.
As Hüpkes (2005) points out, under normal circumstances, the maturity mismatch does not pose a problem, but it makes banks particularly vulnerable to a loss of public confidence.
Heremans & Pacces 2012, p. 572; Schooner & Taylor 2010, p. 27.
In the interbank market, banks borrow and lend funds among each other on a short-term, often unsecured, basis (Schooner & Taylor 2010, p. 28).
Doleys (2012, p. 558) remarks that “investor sensitivities led to a dramatic increase in the cost of capital”.
Banks are ‘special’ in the sense that they are different from non-financial firms. In the first place, banks are characterised by a high leverage. A high leverage means that the amount of equity is very low compared to the amount of debt. It has been observed that the banking sector is the sector with the highest leverage.1 In this respect, banks are different from other firms. In the second place, banks have a large balance sheet compared to non-financial firms. It has been remarked that “the size of the largest banks dwarfs that of the largest non- bank business”.2
But most importantly, banks are more interlinked and more interconnected than non-financial firms. This interconnectedness may create systemic risk. Systemic risk is sometimes related to banks that are too-big-to-fail, too-complexto-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail. It can be argued that in a crisis situation, every bank has systemic relevance.3 The failure of one bank may have dramatic repercussion for other banks. In other words: bank failure is contagious. This goes by many names: contagion effect4, domino-effect5, spill-over effect or systemic risk. Thus, the failure of a bank can have a negative effect on financial stability. Why is bank failure so contagious? This is due to the following reasons.6
Interbank lending
There are direct linkages between banks. This is because banks lend to each other. In other words: banks hold claims on each other.7 If a bank fails and goes into insolvency, then it is no longer able to honour its claims. Consequently, the banks that have claims on the failing bank have to write down their claims.8 This is a form of direct contagion.
Fire-sales
Another connection between banks is related to the fact that banks usually hold similar assets.
If a troubled bank needs funding – and is unable to get enough wholesale funds – it has to sell assets quickly. This may lead to a fall in asset prices. This might depress the value of similar assets held by other banks. This could turn into a negative spiral.9
Confidence
The failure of one bank may trigger a loss of confidence in other banks. Indeed, as a result of the failure of a bank, investors might become worried about the viability of other banks, either because they perceive the other banks as similar to the failed bank or because they expect that the other banks will be affected through the direct linkages with the failed bank.10 Thus, the failure of one bank may trigger a loss of confidence in other banks.11
Such a loss of confidence can have dramatic repercussions. This is because confidence is crucial to the banking sector. Banks are dependent on confidence; this is their ‘Achilles heel’.12 Because of their business model (lending long and borrowing short), access to short-term funding is crucial to banks. This makes it highly important for a bank to retain the confidence of its creditors.13
The most extreme form of a loss of confidence in a bank is a bank run by its depositors. However, because of deposit guarantee schemes, bank runs by depositors are not very likely to happen.14 Nonetheless, deposit guarantee schemes do not mitigate the risk of a ‘modern’ bank run. In that regard, it should be noted that banks are sometimes dependent on the money market and interbank market.15 The funds obtained on these markets are not insured by deposit guarantee schemes. Accordingly, when investors on these markets lose confidence in a bank, then they are likely to withdraw their funds.
Because of the essential role of confidence, the fall of one bank can result in the fall of other banks. And even if the failure of one bank does not lead to a complete downfall of other banks, it may still create problems for those other banks. A bank may face higher funding costs: if investors lose confidence in a bank, then they perceive an investment in that bank to be more risky. Subsequently, they would demand a higher return. In other words: the bank faces higher funding costs.16
To conclude, because of the interconnectedness of the banking sector, bank failure may be contagious. This particular feature of the banking sector makes banks ‘special’ (as compared to non-financial firms).