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The One-Tier Board (IVOR nr. 85) 2012/4.6.5
4.6.5 Conflicts of interest
Mr. W.J.L. Calkoen, datum 16-02-2012
- Datum
16-02-2012
- Auteur
Mr. W.J.L. Calkoen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS597266:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Article 2:140/250 DCC for supervisory board members and article 2:229, 5/238, 5 DCC (as introduced by the Act) for managing directors and executive directors, and see subsection 4.2.5 above.
Article 2:146/256 DCC.
Article 2:129/239, 5 DCC. This duty for supervisory board members was already laid down in article 2:140/250, 2 DCC.
Article 2:129/239, 6 DCC.
Article 2:140/250, 5 DCC.
Mediasafe H, HR 11/9/1998, NJ 1999, 171.
Brandao, HR 3/5/2002, NJ 2002, 393.
Maas v. Amazone, HR 14/11/1940, NJ 1941, 321.
Duplicado, HR 9/7/2004 NJ 2004, 519.
Bruil, HR 29/6/2007, NJ 2007, 420.
He cited, inter alia, Hamilton, The Law of Corporations, 5th ed., p. 468, Corporations, including partnerships and limited liability companies, cases and materials, 6 ed., p. 759 and Dennis Block and § 8.60 Model Business Corporation Act.
The main duty of management board members and supervisory board members under Dutch law is to act in the interests of the company.1 The present law is that where conflicts of interest involving management board members occur, the company should be represented by the supervisory board. Alternatively, the general meeting may always appoint another person as the representative.2 Codified Dutch law deals only with the issue of representation of the company by a management board member in the event of a conflict of interest. This can cause surprises and legal insecurity. The rather complicated caselaw under present Dutch law, with its focus on representation, is discussed below. The legislator wishes to create more legal security in transactions by moving the question of conflict of interest to the decision fase, and basically making it possible for the conflicted person to opt out of the decision making.
The Act has added paragraphs concerning the loyalty of board members and provides that the management board members are to act in the interests of the company.3 The Act adds that if any board member has a conflict of interest he may not participate in the discussion and if all board members have a conflict the decision will be made by the supervisory board or, in the absence of such a board, by the general meeting of shareholders, unless the articles of association provide otherwise.4 In the same way a supervisory board member who has a conflict of interest may not participate in the discussion. If all supervisory board members have a conflict of interest or no decision can be made because a quorum is lacking, the decision will again be made by the general meeting of shareholders, unless the articles of association provide otherwise.5 Where a conflict of interest arises, the Act provides that the director concerned may not have any influence over the decision. The new Dutch arrangement is less flexible than the practical solution adopted in the UK and the US, where a director simply mentions that he has a conflict of interest at the beginring of the meeting and can get board or shareholder ratification. I have come across a UK-trained chairman who was in the Nabit of asking at the start of each meeting whether any board member had a conflict of interest in respect of any points on the agenda. The agenda point would be: "declaration of interest".
The new system of dealing with conflicts of interest during the decision making stage as provided for in the Act is an improvement on the present Dutch system of focusing on the representation stage.
The case law of the last 15 years shows how complicated this focus on representation is.
The Mediasafe II case (1998)6 put an end to the old practice of permitting one person to represent many parties in a deal. An agreement was signed by one director for the parent and the subsidiary to give set-off and/or joint and several claim rights to a bank. As the bank could have known of this conflict of interest, it could be held against the bank, thereby invalidating the signature. This was notwithstanding the general rule that the signature of a registered management board member binds a bank.
This Mediasafe H case drew attention to the issue of conflicts of interest and resulted in a flurry of cases. Brandao (2002)7 dealt with a real material conflict of interest where Mr A.J. Maren, as director of Burgslot N.V., signed an agreement on behalf of Sundat N.V., a management BV company which he also represented. Sundat B.V. hired out Maren's two sons to Sundat N.V. on conditions that were very favourable for the sons. Brandao, as shareholder of Sundat N.V., asked the court to set aside the decision of Sundat N.V. to enter into this agreement. It argued that the director of Sundat N.V. had decided to give his sons (working via a management BV) favourable employment terms. The Supreme Court set aside the agreement. This case was comparable to the decision in the old case of Maas v. Amazone (1940)8 where father Maas, acting as director on behalf of the employing company, signed a favourable employment contract in favour of his own son. Here the Supreme Court judged the father to have a conflict of interest. I assume that the Delaware and UK courts would do the same, unless the board or shareholders had ratified the agreement. Dutch law does not have this ratification process.
Duplicado (2004)9 confirmed the Mediasafe // judgment. In this case, a director who owned 100% of the shares of two companies signed on behalf of both companies. His signature was held to be invalid.
Subsequently, the Bruil (2007)10 judgment gave a more nuanced and substantive answer to the question of conflict of interest. Mr Bruil was 100% shareholder and managing director of both Bruil Arnhem B.V. (BA) and Bruil-Kombex B.V. (BK). These companies were both fully owned by Mr Bruil. On behalf of these two companies Mr Bruil had signed contracts under which BA sold some but not all of its real estate to BK (the sale was good for both parties, the price was fair and BA got a contract to build a factory for BK). Each company gave the other a right of first refusal on its real estate. All the shares in BA were subsequently transferred to Ballast Nedam white Mr Bruil kept all the shares in BK. In due course BA sold its real estate to Femhout B.V. without allowing BK to exercise its right of first refusal. BK claimed a penalty payment from BA for its breach of the right of first refusal. BA defended itself by arguing that the right of first refusal was invalid because Mr Bruil had signed on behalf of both companies and had a formal conflict of interest. The argument was rejected by the District Court, but accepted by the Court of Appeal. Before the Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of BK (thereby refusing to set aside the contract), Advocate General L. Timmerman gave a detailed opinion in which he discussed all the case law and literature as well as American law.11 He argued that all of the cited material favoured a nuanced case-by-case factual test of conflict of interest over a mere formal test. The bare possibility of a conflict of interest is not sufficient. He advised that a conflict should be deemed to exist where a personal interest prevails over a company interest, even when no one has suffered any damage. As his opinion was accepted by the Supreme Court, the existence of a conflict of interest now has to be judged on the facts of the case.
Since the Bruil decision of 2007 conflict of interest therefore has to be handled on a case-by-case basis and a nuanced decision taken on the issue of representation. As mentioned above, the Act shifts the focus to the decision making stage.