Consensus on the Comply or Explain Principle
Einde inhoudsopgave
Consensus on the Comply or Explain principle (IVOR nr. 86) 2012/4.7.5:4.7.5 Conclusions
Consensus on the Comply or Explain principle (IVOR nr. 86) 2012/4.7.5
4.7.5 Conclusions
Documentgegevens:
mr. J.G.C.M. Galle, datum 12-04-2012
- Datum
12-04-2012
- Auteur
mr. J.G.C.M. Galle
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS367994:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
In the introduction of this chapter the research question to be examined in this chapter was formulated: What is, based upon comparative legal analysis, the layout of the comply or explain principle as embedded in the corporate governance systems of five Member States and does a common understanding of the principle's scope and most effective form currently exist within the EU? As stated above, after the theoretical framework of this study as sketched in part I, part II encompasses the empirical research and examines the application of the comply or explain principle of the five countries under review in practice by means of a comparative legal analysis (chapter 4) and content analysis of corporate governance statements (chapter 5). The purpose thereof is to be able to analyse the entire empirical as well as theoretical research on the comply or explain principle in chapter 6, and to provide recommendations on how the comply or explain principle should be applied in practice, i.e. the conditions that need to be put in place for it to work properly and as intended.
Differences between the countries under review in the lay-out of their corporate governance systems (with a focus on the codes and comply or explain principle) can still be seen. Especially the aim and a country's corporate governance history are reflected in the codes (path dependency). Does a country genuinely want to improve its corporate governance structure as a result of criticism and previous scandals? Or does a country want to enforce its competitive position within the EU and try to be in line with the international best practice standard? Copying behaviour is often the result. At first glance the main topics in the code often seem similar, and typical cultural features are deliberately left outside the code's provisions and some standardisation can be seen. For instance, all the codes under research strongly focus on the board's functioning and structure. But when a closer look is taken differences can still be seen, such as whether or not there is a focus on a specific board structure or extensive material independence criteria. Moreover, the level of detail of the codes differs, due to poor compliance in the past or the uncertainty avoidance level in a country's culture, as well as to whether the code is a copy of legislation or innovative rules on self-regulation are actually formulated. Culture and the resulting differences are reflected, perhaps not so much in the contents per se, but more in the code's and comply or explain principle's embedding and functioning in practice. The comply or explain principle and its embedding sometimes already were, or over time became part of the corporate culture, whether or not accelerated by the importance of listed companies in a country.
Overall the lay-out of the corporate governance system of the countries under research is properly designed nowadays, which should be reflected in an improved functioning as well. Each country has a national corporate governance code and comply or explain principle in place. This lay-out is easy to keep up-to-date due to the codes as a hybrid instrument. Some countries update their national code annually to the current practice, others less frequently. The comply or explain principle itself of course also facilitates ' made to measure compliance'. The common understanding of the principle itself is gradually increasing in practice, by copying the UK, by finding out which rules it would be best for the principle to apply to and which embedding suits a country best. Directive 2006/ 46/EC achieved further harmonisation by making national codes and the comply or explain principle obligatory. It is left to countries and companies to decide whether 100% compliance with the codes should be aimed for or ' made to measure compliance'. It is also left to them to decide on the rules regarding accountability and whether supervisory instruments should be easy to use or in fact function as a means of exerting pressure. Based on theoretical research a common understanding and harmonisation are increasing - although improvements definitely remain necessary (section 4.7.3). Whether this works as such in practice and which improvements are deemed necessary will be examined further by means of empirical research in the chapter below.
The main conclusions of this chapter are therefore as follows:
The corporate governance codes and comply or explain principle as a substantive part of a national corporate governance system are, in general, developed for two reasons: for genuinely improving a country's corporate governance structure and/or using the code (partly) as a marketing instrument to enhance a country's competitive position;
The features of the countries' cultures are reflected in the code's and comply or explain principle's embedding and functioning in practice, as well as in differences in size and detail of the code, which is partly explainable by the country's uncertainty avoidance level and the role company legislation has;
Although the comply or explain principle and corporate governance codes are sufficiently embedded in the national corporate governance systems of the five countries under research by means of listing rules or legislation, clarity on which code provision the principle is applicable to and whether the corporate governance statement concerns future and/or past code compliance does not always exist;
Due to Directive 2006/46/EC the judicial corporate governance arrangements: self-regulation supported by non-statutory rules (the UK), self-regulation supported by statutory rules (Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands) or regulation of self-regulation (meta-regulation in Germany) remain the options;
The lay-out of the statement (e.g. a narrative or tables) as well as the manner of disclosure (annual report and/or internet), imposed by national regulation, differ between the countries under research, sometimes resulting in ambiguities;
Although Directive 2006/46/EC states that the Member States should have rules on board liability concerning the publication of the corporate governance statement, the countries under research have not implemented this rule sufficiently and the discussion lingers in jurisprudence and doctrine;
Apart from Germany, supervision of (material and formal) code compliance is performed at three levels: by shareholders, the external auditor and an assigned authority, usually the listing authority;
All five countries under research have a standing corporate governance committee, although its role differs and, apart from in the Netherlands and Germany, sufficient annual research on code compliance research is not performed, and
Hence, in practice improvements are necessary and there is as yet no common understanding of the principle's scope and most effective form among the five Member States under research.