Hoofdstuk 12 Summary

An important question in company law is the question as to who determines the outcome of hostile takeovers. Should the board of the target company remain passive or be given an active role? Different answers are given to these questions in different countries. A rough distinction can be made between two basic models. The first model places the decisions regarding the outcome of a hostile takeover entirely in the hands of the shareholders of the target company and sidelines the board. The board should remain passive. In the second model the board has an active role. It acts as a gatekeeper and may take defensive measures to fulfil its role. As a result, shareholders are unable to determine the outcome if the bid is not supported by the board. In practice, this means the bid must be accepted by both the board and the shareholders. The manner in which the board fulfils its role may be reviewed by the courts.

The choice between these two models is, in my opinion, fundamental. In the US, board passivity has explicitly been rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court. The board is expressly permitted to take defensive measures against a hostile takeover. Clearly, the US has opted for the second model. This choice has been passionately debated in the literature for some time, with many arguments arising for and many against board passivity.

Europe has opted for the first model. The main rule of the 13^th EU Directive on Takeover bids (`the Directive') is the passivity rule (Art. 9 of the Directive), which states that a company's board may not take any defensive measures unless this has specifically been approved by the shareholders' meeting. However, as a result of a political compromise, the passivity rule has become optional. The Directive provides Member States with the possibility of not making the passivity rule mandatory (Art. 12 of the Directive). In implementing the Directive, the Dutch legislator has chosen not to make the passivity rule mandatory and to adhere to the principle that a company's board may take defensive measures. As a result, the assessment of a board's actions in hostile takeover situations is, ultimately, lelt to the courts, as it is in the US. The second model has therefore also been opted for in the Netherlands.

The situation in the Netherlands is therefore very similar to the situation in the US. When the Directive was implemented, however, surprisingly few debates centred on the fundamental question as to what is the right role for the board in hostile takeover situations. The rejection of the passivity tule received hardly any attention; the second model was almost automatically opted for. It would appear that the Dutch line pursued by the legislator and the courts is influenced by American practice. Not only does the Netherlands, like the US, reject the passivity tule, influences that are clearly American are also seen in case law. In addition, the argument of a level playing field with the US also played a significant part in the rejection of the passivity tule. This argument states that implementation of the passivity rule would make it easier for American companies to take over Dutch companies, whilst American companies would still be able to defend themselves.This would result in an uneven playing field. It is clear from the above that it is worthwhile examining American practice more closely. More specifically, this study aims to answer the following three research questions:

Chapter 2 deals with the Dutch antitakeover practice. The Netherlands has a long history of defensive measures. Traditionally, the board is in principle permitted to take defensive measures in order to fend off an unwelcome bidder. The most common defensive measure is the possibility of issuing preference shares. Other measures include priority shares, depositary receipts for shares, crown jewel defenses, deal protection measures and golden parachutes. As stated above, when it implemented the Directive, the Netherlands did not make the passivity tule mandatory. Companies are free to apply the passivity tule but this possibility has so far not been made use of in the Netherlands. This means that Dutch listed companies are still to a certain extent permitted to take defensive measures. The existing case law of the Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Ondernemingskamer) and the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), in which certain standards of conduct have been developed for this based on the open standards provided for in Section 8 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), thus remains relevant also after implementation of the Directive. In particular the decisions of the Enterprise Division and the Supreme Court involving RNA, Stork, ABN AMRO and ASMI provide some guidance The case law is, however, difficult to interpret. The rulings moreover confirm that there is considerable room for different interpretations. In the RNA and ABN AMRO cases as well as the ASMI case, ultimately the Supreme Court's opinion differed from that of the Enterprise Division. An appeal against the Stork ruling of the Enterprise Division was not filed. In the RNA case, the Supreme Court appears to have given a logical standard. It is, however, still not very clear how the RNA standard is applied in specific situations. In the Stork and ABN AMRO rulings, the Enterprise Division did not apply the RNA standard. In the ASMI case, the Enterprise Division states that it did apply the RNA standard as a point of departure but this ruling has also not diminished the Jack of clarity. All in all, many questions remain. It is still not clear how the different defensive measures will be reviewed in certain situations.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to the American antitakeover practice. Like the Netherlands, the US has a long history of defensive measures, the best-known of which is the poison pill. The charters and by-laws of most companies can also contain defensive provisions, such as staggered boards. And finally, the American defence practice includes the issue of shares (to a white squire) and measures such as crown jewel defenses, deal protection measures and golden parachutes. In the US, the question whether a board may take defensive measures and to what extent emerged in case law quite some time ago. In the late 70s and early 80s a now classic discussion ensued between those in favour of and those opposing an active role for the board. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court took part in the debate. It gave four rulings in that year, which together form the framework for the assessment of a board's actions in hostile takeover situations. In these rulings, the passivity concept is unequivocally rejected. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that defensive measures, including the extremely effective poison pill, are permitted in the US and that the board has broad powers, ensuring that it can actually take these measures. In the famous Unocal ruling, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the actions of the board are protected in the case of a threat to the corporate policy and effectiveness and if the defensive measure is reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Also given the later interpretation in case law, it is not really all that difficult in actual practice for a board to comply with the Unocal standard. The rulings of the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 did not put an end to the debate between those in favour of and those opposing an active role for the board in the case of a hostile takeover. The discussion has continued unabated and rages on to this day. There is still a traditional two-way split, with on the one hand those in favour of board primacy, also known as the traditionalists, and on the other hand those in favour of shareholder primacy.

Based on Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 concludes that similarities and differences can be seen in the manner in which American and Dutch companies are able to defend themselves against hostile takeovers. At the same time, it can be concluded that this analysis does not suffice to answer the research questions. It is not sufficient to examine the defence practice and relevant case law. Three major issues must also be examined. These issues and the ensuing differences are discussed in Part II. Finally, based on the analyses in Parts I and II, the three research questions are answered in Part III.

The first relevant difference between both countries involves the rules which must be observed by the acquirer in a hostile takeover. In Chapter 5 the rules are described which apply to the acquisition of shares, both privately on the stock exchange and through a public offer. It is also established that the rules that apply to reporting equity interests in the Netherlands and the US are, barring a few differences, mostly similar. In both countries, the emphasis is on transparency. It is considered important that, if an acquirer acquires a certain interest in a company, this is disclosed by the acquirer. Where public offers are concerned, it can also be concluded that the rules show some similarities. In both countries, offerers must prepare a comprehensive document which includes a considerable amount of information. The information to be included is, on the whole, comparable. Also, the target company's obligation in the US to state its position with regard to the public offer is comparable to the obligation in the Netherlands. Furthermore, similar procedural rules apply in both countries, such as the all-holders and bestprice rules, and the right of shareholders to withdraw the registration of their shares. The main difference is undoubtedly the mandatory bid rule. This rule ensues from the Directive (Art. 5) and states that if someone acquires 30% of the shares, he is obliged to make a bid for all of the other shares in the company in question. Such a rule does not exist in the US. This has farreaching consequences for takeover practice and the dynamics on the take-over market. The obligation to make a bid provides shareholders of Dutch listed companies with a statutory exit option in the case of a change of control. This offers the shareholders some form of protection. The mandatory bid rule also provides companies with some protection, as it ensures that nobody is able to acquire more than 30% of a company without making a bid.

A second relevant difference between the two legal systems presents itself in Chapter 6. Practice shows that, even if a public offer is successful and control has been gained over the target company, some of the shareholders of the target company have not registered their shares. A minority of the shareholders therefore always remains. For many reasons, the offerer will also wish to acquire the shares of this remaining minority. In actual practice there are different ways in which the remaining minority can be squeezed out. Compared to those in the US, the possibilities in the Netherlands are much more limited. In the US, the remaining minority shareholders cannot prevent being squeezed out during a cash-out merger (receiving compensation in cash), even if the acquirer only holds a slim majority. If the acquirer holds more than 90% of the shares, the squeeze-out can be accomplished in a simplified procedure, i.e. through a short-form merger. Such cash-out mergers are not possible in the Netherlands. If a bidder has more than 95%, a buy-out is possible under Section 92(a) or 359(c) of Book 2 of the Civil Code. The result is somewhat similar to the American short-form merger. If the acquirer holds less than 95% of the shares, he will have to make do with a triangular merger. This means that the remaining minority shareholders will receive shares in another entity in exchange for their shares in the target company. Not a squeeze-out in cash, therefore, and not a complete squeeze-out either. This can result in complications. At most, the acquirer can effect a triangular merger, thereby reducing the holdings of the remaining minority to below 5%, after which the acquirer can effect a buy-out under Section 92(a) of Book 2 of the Civil Code. This possibility is, however, limited. The requirements of reasonableness and fairness, ensuing from Section 8 of Book 2 of the Civil Code, must be complied with. This is also apparent from the rulings of the Enterprise Division and the Supreme Court in the Versatel case in which, in the end, the squeeze-out was unsuccessful.

A third relevant difference between the Netherlands and the US ensues from the manner in which shareholders can, in practice, take part in the decision-making process at shareholders' meetings. This difference presents itself in Chapter 7 and specifically concerns the question whether an efficient proxy voting system exists. In reviewing the defensive measures, American courts emphasize the importance of the fact that there is the possibility of replacing the board through a proxy contest. In the US, a proxy contest is, to a certain extent, an alternative to a public offer and is also frequently used to support a public offer. By soliciting sufficient proxies to replace the board, actual control can also be gained over the target company in this manner. The target company is in this case taken over through the acquisition of proxies instead of through the acquisition of shares. In the US, a comprehensive legal and practical framework has existed for proxy voting sine the 1930s. A similar system does not exist in the Netherlands, partly due to a number of problems involving cross-border voting, which require a European solution. Unfortunately, the European Shareholders' Rights Directive has not provided a solution to problems involving cross-border voting. Proxy contests in order to replace the board, which are possible in the US, therefore do not exist in the Netherlands.

Chapter 8 focuses on the first research question, whether the choice of giving the board an active role in hostile takeovers and thus rejecting the passivity tule is justified based on the argument of a level playing field with the US. This question is answered based on an analysis of the differences between the Netherlands and the US, as described in Parts I and II (§ 8.2). The analysis shows that American companies have wider defensive possibilities than Dutch companies. This is mainly due to the fact that shareholders in the US have fewer corporate powers and due to the ample possibilities which takeover case law offers American companies to take defensive measures. There are some differences which neutralize this effect somewhat, such as a more important role of private enforcement, the stronger focus on shareholders' interest, the protection of minority shareholders and the existence of the proxy voting system, but these do not fundamentally change this conclusion. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the passivity tule not having been made mandatory in the Netherlands is indeed justifiable. Implementing the passivity tule would result in an even greater difference in board autonomy and thus create an uneven playing field for takeovers. I would, however, not like to base this conclusion entirely on the argument of a level playing field with the US, as this argument has a number of limitations (§ 8.3). A first limitation is the fact that in my opinionit cannot be said with certainty whether there is level playing field between two countries. Corporate governance systems are also determined by many other factors, such as economie and financial relationships and traditions, cultural views and customs and political and social relationships. Other legal areas also play a part. An all-embracing analysis and comparison of all of these factors cannot be made.

A second reason why caution must be exercised when drawing a conclusion about the correct role of the board based on an analysis of a level playing field with the US is its limited scope. Not only the playing field with the US is relevant to the Netherlands. The playing field within Europe should also be examined, and that with other countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia. In reply to the first research question, it can therefore be stated that the argument of a level playing field with the US is a reason for rejecting the passivity rule. I would, however, not like to base the choice of an active role for the board and rejection of the passivity rule on this argument alone. This brings me to the second research question.

Chapter 9 focuses on the second research question, namely whether the choice of an active role for the board and rejection of the passivity rule is justified based on other arguments. To answer this question, the arguments for and against an active role for the board are examined, as they have arisen in the extensive discussion in the US. In doing so, the differences ensuing from Parts I and II are taken into account. In § 9.2 the arguments against an active role for the board are discussed. These rely heavily on the agency costs theory and the belief that the passivity rule will ensure that these costs are limited. If the board is able to take defensive measures against a takeover, this will interfere with the market for corporate control. Without a real takeover threat, boards will not do their utmost (ex ante effect) or will use their powers to protect their own position (ex post effect). This results in high agency costs. The passivity rule solves the ex post conflict of interest problem and, moreover, ensures that constant pressure is exerted, ex ante, by creating an efficient market for corporate control. Hostile takeovers are special transactions, which put a safety valve on the system and ensure that a poorly performing board can, as a last resort, be replaced against its will. If the board is able to prevent these takeovers, the safety valve will no longer work. In addition, as residual claimants, shareholders are best placed to determine the outcome of a takeover.

The arguments in favour of an active role for the board (and therefore against the passivity rule) are discussed in § 9.3. They rely heavily on the view that the position of the board in hostile takeover situations is no different from its position in any other situation, in which the benefits of a strong central management manifest themselves just as clearly. The board is better placed than shareholders to weigh up and safeguard the long-term interests of the company and its stakeholders. Passivity has no place here. The board is specifically appointed to manage a company, since widely dispersed shareholders are not able to do so. In addition, more interests are involved than just the controlling of agency costs between shareholders and the board. The rejection of the passivity rule means opting for an ex post review of the board's actions by the courts. This offers possibilities for a more flexible and situation-specific standard than the passivity rule.

In my opinion, none of these arguments separately are decisive. A case can be made for the arguments from both camps and, to my knowledge, there is no decisive proof that one model is better than the other. Deciding on the right role for the board is, in the end, a matter of choice. It boils down to weighing up the advantages of an active role for the board, the disadvantages of such a role and the necessity that the board must be effectively held accountable and disciplined. In weighing this up, my conclusion is that an active role for the board is best for our Dutch system and that there are good reasons not to apply the passivity rule. This does not mean to say that the role for the board is limitless. I am convinced that the takeover market has a disciplinary effect and actually functions as a safety valve on the system. The takeover market is only able to fulfil this role if the outcome of a takeover bid is ultimately determined by the shareholders by deciding whether or not they wish to tender their shares in the bid. However, I do not believe that the passivity rule is necessary for this. In my opinion, this can be achieved by retaining an active role for the board, provided the courts apply the proper standard of review to assess the actions of the board.

This brings us to the third research question, which is answered in Chapter 10. If the board is given an active role and the passivity rule is rejected, how then should the actions of the board be assessed and can the American discussion and case law help in the application and interpretation of this assessment? The core of my argument is a plea for a broad and consistent application of the RNA standard to review the use of defensive measures (§ 10.2). The RNA standard as I have interpreted it, is similar to the American Unocal standard. In this context, the question arose whether the Netherlands also needs separate Revlon and Blasius standards, which in the American practice supplement the Unocal standard. My conclusion is that this is not the case. Rather, I argue that the same standard be applied consistently to increase legai certainty. Supplementary standards are not necessary. The RNA standard can also be used in these situations. A broad and consistent application of the RNA standard means that it is applied as much as possible, in inquiry proceedings as well as in proceedings in which the annulment of decisions is demanded, pursuant to Section 15(1)(b) in conjunction with Section 8 of Book 2 of the Civil Code. This also entails that the RNA standard must be applied in every defensive situation, whether a public offer or activism is concerned, and to as many defensive measures as possible, such as deal protection measures or crown jewel defenses. A broad and consistent application can only be achieved if it is clear what the RNA standard is exactly and how it must be applied. In practice, the RNA standard has proved difficult to interpret. In my interpretation, the RNA standard can be divided into two steps, somewhat similar to the Unocal standard in the US. In the first place, a real threat must exist (§ 10.3). This first step of the RNA standard concerns when and in which situations the board may take defensive measures. These must be taken in reaction to a real threat. Two possible threats can be distilled from the RNA ruling against which defensive measures may be taken: a threat to the (continuity of the) company's policy and a threat to the interests of the company and its stakeholders, including the shareholders. This is where the plurality of interests, which is so characteristic of Dutch corporate law, manifeste itself. In my opinion, this defence of the (continuity of the) company's policy is the most important justification for defensive measures.

The second step of the RNA standard is that the defensive action must be effective and proportional in relation to the threat posed (§ 10.4). The first step concerns the question whether the defensive measures could be justified; the second step concerns the question whether the defensive measures are actually justified in that specific situation. This essentially makes the second step the substantive standard of the board's conduct in hostile takeover situations. In interpreting it, the premises stated above must be taken into account. The standard allows the board to take on an active role as gatekeeper. The defensive measures may, however, not impede the market for corporate control, which has a disciplinary effect and ultimately also acts as a safety valve for the system. This means that shareholders should in principle be able to determine the outcome of a hostile bid. In situations where there is shareholder activism, this means that the wish of a majority of the shareholders may not be ignored unrestrictedly. A general answer to the question as to what an effective and proportional reaction is cannot be given in my opinion. The manner in which the RNA standard can be applied in different situations can, however, be clarified on a number of points. In the first place, greater clarity can be provided about which defensive measures can be assessed under the RNA standard (§ 10.4.1). For this, it is useful to make a distinction between pre-threat and post-threat measures. In my opinion, all post-threat measures can be reviewed under the RNA standard. Such situations involve measures such as the issue of preference shares, deal protection measures, crown jewel defenses and golden parachutes. A second question is how courts should assess whether a defensive measure is actually an effective and proportional reaction (§ 10.4.2). In my opinion, it follows from the RNA standard that a court must exercise restraint in its assessment. The second step is essentially the formulation under corporate law of the principle of proportionality, which is a generally accepted legal principle. This principle requires that value judgments and a proper balancing of interests be made. These interests are often incomparable, however. This is also the case in corporate law. The interests of a number of stakeholders are involved, including shareholders. A binding hierarchy cannot be given for the different interests. The principle of proportionality and therefore also the RNA standard do not provide any reference points for how these incomparable interests must be balanced against each other. This means that there is a considerable amount of discretionary power for the board and automatically results in a cautious and limited assessment. No rational arguments can, after all, be given as to why the opinion of the courts would be better than that of the board. What it boils down to is a reasonableness test . The courts should only rule a defensive measure unacceptable if it is evidently unreasonable. In this case, it is particularly important that the board has followed a due process. Finally, I have discussed a number of factors which affect the assessment whether a defensive action is an effective and proportional reaction (§ 10.4.3). A number of generally relevant factors are stated first, including the role of the supervisory directors. For each defensive measure, some criteria are then given which could be relevant when this measure is assessed. The recent case law is also discussed, especially how the RNA standard could have been applied in those cases. This answers the third research question. With this approach, an unequivocal standard is applied based on which it can be decided whether, in a specific case, actions were taken that are contrary to the requirements of reasonableness and fairness arising from Section 8 of Book 2 of the Civil Code. In this context I have aimed, partly inspired by the discussion and case law in the US, to provide greater clarity about when this standard should be applied and which factors are relevant to the application and interpretation of the standard.