Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.III.1.3.1
8.III.1.3.1 General
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS267123:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
For the sake of clarity, investment firms themselves could provide more post-trade data than prescribed by MiFID I (e.g. more detailed), without prejudice to national regulation or the MiFID I requirements. The additional information was not subject to the MiFID I post-trade transparency regime. The reasoning is the same as for RMs and MTFs (see section II above).
CESR, MiFID I Review, July 2010(CESR/10-802), p. 20.
The general post-trade transparency obligations were laid down in the MiFID I Directive. The MiFID I Directive required investment firms to make public ‘at least’ (1) the price; (2) the volume; and (3) the time of the transactions executed in shares admitted to trading on an RM.1 The term ‘at least’ indicated that the obligation was minimum harmonised. Member States were permitted to lay down stricter post-trade transparency obligations than set out under MiFID I.2 MiFID I did not require investment firms to make public their identity when transacting outside an RM or MTF. MiFID I ‘only’ required the investment firm to publish the general code ‘OTC’, unless the investment firm was an SI.3 An exception to the foregoing was in place for SIs in case the SI published aggregated quarterly data as to the transactions executed in the SI capacity. In this situation, the SI could publish a general ‘SI’ code.4 The rationale of the exception was to protect the SI against position risks due to identity exposure.5