Einde inhoudsopgave
Remedies for infringements of EU law in legal relationships between private parties (LBF vol. 18) 2019/3.3.2.2
3.3.2.2 A titanic struggle: the right to collective action and the freedom to provide services
mr. I.V. Aronstein, datum 01-09-2019
- Datum
01-09-2019
- Auteur
mr. I.V. Aronstein
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS141383:1
- Vakgebied(en)
EU-recht / Algemeen
Burgerlijk procesrecht / Algemeen
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
CJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05 (Laval), para. 91. Azoulai 2008, pp. 1338 and 1346-1347. When the CJ delivered its ruling in Laval, the Charter was not yet legally binding. From December 2009 the Charter gained the same status as the Treaties and became legally binding.
Ibid., paras. 93-96. Cf. Azoulai 2008, p. 1347. See further §8.3.
Azoulai argues that it concerns a ‘reasonableness test’ different from the usual proportionality test under Article 52 TFEU: Azoulai 2008, pp. 1346-1349. Meanwhile Article 52(1) Charter explicitly states that any limitation of the exercise of the rights entrenched in the Charter is subject to the principle of proportionality and that limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Cf. CJ 17 April 2018, Case C‑‑414/16 (Egenberger), paras. 80-81. See §8.3.1.
CJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05 (Laval), paras. 99-100.
Ibid., para. 101. See also e.g. CJ 5 December 2006, Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 (Cipolla), para. 61.
CJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05 (Laval), paras. 103-105.
Related to the signature of the collective agreement for the building sector, which level of protection is – at some points – higher than the level of protection in the Directive and thus constitutes from the perspective of workers more favourable terms and conditions. Cf. CJ 18 December 2007, CJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05 (Laval), para. 102.
Ibid., paras. 106-108. Critically on this issue: Azoulai 2008, pp. 1344-1349 and 1354.
Ibid., paras. 110-111. Skouris 2009, pp. 27-29.
Ibid., paras. 108-111.
Skouris 2009, pp. 27-29.
See for instance: Azoulai 2008. Davies 2008; Joerges & Rödl 2009; Hös 2002; Van Leeuwen 2012. Also the trade unions, the ECSR, the ILO and a number of scholars bombarded the Court’s judgment as well as that of the Arbetsdomstolen with criticism and questions. See §3.3.4.5 for a reflection of the aftermath of Laval.
See for example Reich & Bernitz 2011, who applaud the rulings of both the Court of Justice and the Arbetsdomstolen (discussed below).
104. The Court opens the principal part of its judgment by stating that “although the right to take collective action must [...] be recognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law the observance of which the Court ensures, the exercise of that right may nonetheless be subject to certain restrictions. As is reaffirmed by Article 28 Charter, it is to be protected in accordance with Community law and national law and practices”.1 Objectively, the right to collective action, as a fundamental right, could constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services allowed by Article 52 TFEU.2 Whether that is indeed the case in the situation at hand, is determined by a proportionality test in which the fundamental freedom to provide services enters the fray with the fundamental right to collective action.3
105. The Court employs the principle of effectiveness and states that in the case at hand the right to collective action, by which foreign undertakings may be forced to sign a collective agreement, is liable to make it less attractive, or more difficult, for such undertakings to provide their services. Therefore, the right to collective action constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services.4
106. The Court reiterates that “since the freedom to provide services is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, a restriction on that freedom is warranted only if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons of public interests; if that is the case, it must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it” [Emphasis added: I.A.].5 In other words: restrictions of fundamental freedoms are assessed on the basis of the proportionality principle. According to the Court, the protection of workers in the host state against social dumping can be considered a legitimate aim. In that regard the Court considers that the Union not only has an economic purpose, but a social purpose too. Therefore “the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy”.6 The Court holds that in this specific case the obstacle that the collective action forms in view of the specific obligations7 the trade unions seek to impose on Laval cannot be justified with regard to the objective of the protection of workers.8 Concerning the negotiations on pay in particular, the Court of Justice argues that the collective action in the main proceedings cannot be justified in light of the public interest objective.9 The specific circumstances of the case and the aim of the collective actions – i.e. discriminating Laval on the basis of nationality and forcing Laval to sign a collective agreement that was more favourable for workers than the relevant implementation legislation required – resulted in the conclusion that in this particular case the right to collective action could not serve as a justification for the restriction of the freedom to provide services.10 The collective actions initiated by the trade unions in this particular case are thus precluded by Article 56 TFEU.11 This ‘mechanism’ and the victory of the freedom to provide services was not welcomed with open arms by everybody.12 Others argue that the Court had no other option considering the wording and weight of Article 56 TFEU and the concrete circumstances of the case.13