Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/9.II.1.5.3
9.II.1.5.3 Exclusion of OTFs from the equity post-trade transparency regime
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266991:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Oxford EU Law Library, 2014, p. 456; Danish Presidency MiFID II/MiFIR Progress Report, 20 June 2012, p. 4-5; and Cyprus Presidency MiFID II/MiFIR Progress Report, 13 December 2012(16523/12), p. 4-5.
See, for example, Ministry of Finance the Netherlands, Affairs (Ministerie van Financiën), Beantwoording schriftelijk overleg MiFID II/MiFIR, 10 september 2013, p. 11.
See, for example, Ministry of Finance the Netherlands, Affairs (Ministerie van Financiën), Beantwoording schriftelijk overleg MiFID II/MiFIR, 10 september 2013, p. 11.
Reference is made to N. Moloney, House of Lords, EU Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, MiFID II: Getting it Right for the City and EU Financial Services Industry, 12 June 2019, p. 9. For contrary opinions, see the Dutch Ministry of Finance (Ministerie van Financiën), Beantwoording schriftelijk overleg MiFID II/MiFIR, 10 september 2013, p. 11.
European Parliament, adoption of MiFIR, 15 April 2014. The final political compromise for confining the OTF to non-equity was that: (1) the OTF would be permitted to engage in ‘matched principal trading’; (2) shares would be required to be concentrated on RMs, MTFs, SIs, and equivalent third-country trading venues; and (3) any investment firm operating an internal matching system executing client orders on a multilateral basis needed to be authorised as an MTF (ibid). Earlier drafts went back and forth concerning whether or not to confine the OTF to non-equity only. See European Parliament, MiFIR Proposal, October 2012(A7-0303/2012) and Council, MiFIR Proposal, 18 June 2013(11007/13).
MiFID II has introduced a new trading venue, that is – the OTF (Organised Trading Facility). A main difference between OTFs and RMs/MTFs is that OTFs are discretionary venues. While RMs and MTFs have non-discretionary rules for the execution of transactions, OTFs carry out order execution on a discretionary basis. The OTF has been introduced to complement the existing types of trading venues, that is – RMs and MTFs.1 The MiFID IIequity post-trade transparency regime does not apply to OTFs.
The exclusion of OTFs from the equity markets, including the applicability of equity (pre- and) post-trade transparency rules, proved to be controversial in drafting MiFID II. Sharp points of difference arose as to the balance between organised and non-organised trading, as well as on the treatment of equity versus non-equity markets. The Commission’s MiFIR Proposal wanted to introduce the OTF. In view of the Commission, the OTF would make the European markets more transparent and level the playing field between various venues offering trading services.2 The Commission proposed the OTF to apply to both equity and non-equity instruments. The Commission suggested identical equity post-trade (and equity pre-trade) transparency obligations for RMs, MTFs, and OTFs.3
The MiFID II Proposal of the Commission was changed during the subsequent negotiations in the European Parliament and the Council. The European Parliament confined the scope of the OTF to non-equity only.4 The Council was strongly divided when it came to the OTF classification. Some Member States favoured the OTF, but called for less stringent requirements. Others were in favour of a strict OTF regime (including equity), and others calling for the removal of the OTF and for all trading to take place on RMs, MTFs, and SIs.5
Different arguments were put forward to confine the OTF to non-equity only. Some Member States argued that a disadvantage of OTFs available for equity instruments would be that by adding an additional regulated venue fragmentation in equity trading could increase. Increased fragmentation would make it harder to determine what ‘the’ price for an equity instrument would be (price formation could be harmed).6 Second, some Member States saw the additional competition presented by OTFs as a disadvantage. These Member States feared that the trading that took place on a national RM or MTF would move towards an OTF not necessarily available in the Member State.7 Third and finally, it was believed (although not universally) that the discretionary nature of the OTF could harm the quality of price formation in the equity markets, especially for pre-trade information.8
After complex negotiations, political compromise was finally reached. MiFID II would confine the OTF to non-equity only.9 The implication for the MiFID II equity post-trade transparency regime was that the OTF would fall outside the scope. The only trading venues subject to the MiFID II equity post-trade transparency would be RMs and MTFs. This position is also apparent in the final MiFID II-regime. MiFID II applies equity post-trade transparency obligations to RMs and MTFs, but not to OTFs.10