3.2.3.1 Koinsep Merimna Ygeias (KMY)

KMY is a Greek Koinsep of Care. Its statutory social purpose is to provide social care services exclusively to disadvantaged and vulnerable societal groups. KMY was founded in 2013 by six paediatricians with a social mission to provide medical and care services to children, the elderly, the disabled and people who are chronically ill. In its start-up phase, KMY was actually involved in a public policy scheme, provided in the Greek tailor-made legislation for the Koinsep, which allowed the award of direct public contracts to the Koinsep by municipal authorities and public law entities for the implementation of delayed public projects. The public policy scheme was ultimately terminated on the basis of consistent decisions from the Greek Court of Audit, which ruled that this policy breached the EU and Greek public procurement law. The ruling significantly affected the contracts of many Koinseps in Greece, which assigned them with large projects as their core business activity. In the context of this public policy, KMY agreed in a public contract with the Greek Εθνικό Ίδρυμα Κωφών (Greek National Institute for the Deaf – hereafter ‘EIK’) to implement two major projects in a period of one year: (i) the provision of social care services to children with hearing problems in three Greek big cities, particularly with respect to the early detection and the early intervention, diagnosis and treatment of children and infants with hearing problems; and (ii) the provision of training and learning of Greek Sign Language (hereafter ‘GSL’) to students. For this project, KMY 21 experts-employees, such as doctors, social workers, nurses, teachers and administrative staff, nursery teachers, speech therapists, sign language interpreters and a psychologist.

All members participating in KMY’s managing committee (i.e. six members) are KMY’s cooperative shareholders/members (out of eight members) and thus members of the general meeting of the members (Art. 32, Statute of Association; EK Interview, 13 October 2014).

Decisions regarding the daily management and administration of the organisation are made by the managing committee; the general meeting of the members is the highest governing body to have the competence to decide on every matter and to supervise and control the managing committee (Art. 22 and 12, Statute of Association). The general meeting of the members is annually convened, as opposed to the managing committee which meets on a weekly basis to dis-cuss and take decisions. Thus, it is the body competent of dealing with all issues relevant to the implementation of the assigned public contact (Art. 13 and 23, Statute of Association; EK Interview, 13 October 2014; NK Interview, 2 November 2014). The members of the managing committee exercise their voting rights equally with one vote. Voting is always exercised openly and democratically, and decisions are always made unanimously (EK Interview, 13 October 2014; NK Interview, 2 November 2014).

The decision-making processes of KMY’s managing committee are not regularly open to third parties or non-members, such as employees and stakeholders (NK Interview, 2 November 2014; EM Interview, 14 October 2014; EK Interview, 13 October 2014). Membership is crucial, and employees who are not members are not regularly allowed or invited to attend the decision-making processes of the managing committee (NK Interview, 2 November 2014; EM Interview, 14 October 2014; EK Interview, 13 October 2014). Nevertheless, KMY provides comprehensive information to employees regarding the rights, obligations, benefits and challenges that membership confers by explaining to the employees that membership will allow them to participate in the decision- making processes (EK Interview, 13 October 2014; EM Interview, 14 October 2014). Contrary to the empirical findings reported by Campi et al. concerning social enterprises in the examined Greek social enterprises, the decision-making power of the stakeholders is symbolic rather than real.1

Except for KMY’s founder, president and owner, who was initially assigned to the project as an employee (follow-up interview by NK, 21 March 2016), none of the other KMY staff employed as of October 2014 has been granted membership. Accordingly, as Adam notes, the participation of stakeholders does not materialise as a coercive necessity in formal terms because the legal framework,2 which in the case of Greece indeed, as Campi et al. note, permits but does not require the involvement of even one category of stakeholders.3 None of KMY’s employees/non-members could therefore participate in KMY’s decision-making processes. Two KMY members who are also members of KMY’s managing committee stated that employees did not feel the urge to become members by assuming ownership of the organisation and participating in KMY’s governance. They did so mainly out of distrust and because they are uncertain about the Koinsep’s legislative and regulatory framework. One KMY member mentioned that ‘When the legislation regarding the Koinsep was introduced, we were already in a crisis. There was already a crisis of [personal] values and distrust towards the state, which turned out to be reasonable’ (EK Interview, 13 October 2014).

Additionally, due to the same lack of trust in the legal and regulatory framework, the members of KMY let to make the governance model less attractive and more closed to employees and new members without further developing the concept of employee participation (EK interview, 13 October 2014; NK interview, 2 November 2014). They only decided to retain the founding members of the organisation in governance positions, aiming to gradually open the governance and ownership model to other stakeholders and employees depending on KMY’s future growth and success. The decision was made on the assumption that the concluded public contract, pending the ruling of the Greek Court of Audit, could be terminated. The termination of the contract could expose the members of the cooperative to financial risks that employees as members could not potentially bear, precisely in view of their status and origin from vulnerable groups in Greek society, i.e. the long-term unemployed and the poor. This shows that, other than the autonomous decisions of the social enterprise’s founders and owners, the materialisation of stakeholder participation and membership depends not only on the urges of stakeholders but also on other factors, such as institutional trust.

Indeed, prior to the termination of the public contract and while implementation of the project was proceeding, KMY accepted two new cooperative members, a decision that ultimately proved to be ‘problematic’ – as it was characterised by both KMY members (EK Interview, 13 October 2014; NK Interview, 2 November 2014). The new members were two midwife-experts who voluntarily designed new projects to expand KMY’s business activities beyond the collaboration with the public sector, i.e. the provision of parenting support classes and breastfeeding seminars (EK Interview, 13 October 2014; NK Interview, 2 November 2014). While explaining why she abstained from assuming ownership and membership and thus from participating in the decision-making activities, one KMY employee claimed that the organisation was still young and evolving. This also showed that the organisation was still immature and did not have concrete evidence regarding its growth and success (EM Interview, 14 October 2014). According to the employee, the project was going well and she was convinced that membership was the next step. However, her employment with KMY was eventually ended following the termination of the public contract (EM Interview, 14 October 2014). Despite never participating in formal decision-making activities, the same employee always felt that she influenced decisions by communicating continuously and informally with KMY’s President. As such, she felt that she always had a clear understanding of the decisions that were made and was able to make a contribution. She said that ‘although I was not a member of the managing committee, I always had a voice in the decision-making. I was asked to provide one’ (EM Interview, 14 October 2014). This type of interaction is characterised by actual cooperation with a high degree of informality as noted by Adam and Campi et al.4 Additionally, with regard to employee issues concerning the operational implementation of the project, the employee indicated that informal regular participation mechanisms were developed internally. She mentioned that ‘informal employee meetings took place every Friday after working hours’ and that these became more frequent over the course of time ‘when issues occurred, we could always schedule informal meetings with the President of KMY to discuss and exchange views on a common ground’ (EM Interview, 14 October 2014). She also said that with regard to decisions made following the termination of the public contract, she attended regular meetings with the members of KMY in which she was asked to present her view.

Another significant stakeholder of KMY is EIK: KMY’s client and major financier. Based on the concluded public contract, EIK was responsible for financing and providing all the resources required for the implementation of the project in return for the services provided by KMY. Although KMY’s President was in continuous communication with EIK’s representatives, not only regarding developments in the implementation of the project (through structural and informal working meetings), but also regarding work in progress and future plans, EIK representatives never attended a session of KMY’s managing committee (follow-up interview by NK, 21 March 2016, deduced CR interview, 19 January 2015). EIK’s representatives confirmed that they always had sufficient access to information regarding KMY’s decision-making processes. Upon being asked the questions ‘did you have access to information regarding KMY’s activities and decisions that were made?’ and ‘did you ever attend consultation processes regarding the decisions made by KMY’, EIK’s representative confirmed that ‘yes, this is what we had agreed. I was a member of the Committee that controlled the implementation of the project (…). At the beginning, I was also in charge of signing the consultation processes’ (CR Interview, 19 January 2015). The contracting parties agreed to establish a monitoring committee with a formal and regular character to which they entrusted the design, administration, monitoring and evaluation of the project (Art. 9, Programmatic Agreement). The KMY-EIK monitoring committee was a forum comprising representatives from EIK’s administration and KMY’s managers with the responsibility to evaluate and monitor the progress of the implementation on a monthly basis.

Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, the monitoring committee could authorise the provision of financial resources from EIK to KMY. During the sessions of the monitoring Committee, EIK’s representative admitted that she was often informed extensively and in detail regarding decisions made by KMY’s managing committee (CR Interview, 19 January 2015). These decisions were often discussed and views were exchanged prior to their authorisation. However, there was also always a great deal of uncertainty among EIK’s representatives regarding the legal framework and the cooperation with KMY; this did not allow the relationship to grow, neither as a coercive necessity because of the legal framework nor as an actual cooperation. As EIK’s representative put it:

Prior to the termination of the public contract, the sessions of the Monitoring Committee were ultimately ended because of a lack of legal grounds for the collaboration (CR Interview, 19 January 2015).