Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.II.1.3.1
8.II.1.3.1 General
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266649:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
The term ‘system’ encompassed all those markets that were composed of a set of rules and a trading platform as well as those that only function on the basis of a set of rules. Transactions concluded under those rules were considered to be concluded under the systems of an RM or an MTF (recital 6 MiFID I Directive and art. 27(4) MiFID I Implementing Regulation).
The foregoing was without prejudice to the possibility of RMs and MTFs themselves to publish more post-trade data than prescribed by MiFID II. Such post-trade information is not constrained by the MiFID II equity post-trade transparency regime. Reference is made to ESMA, Consultation Paper: MiFID II/MiFIR, 22 May 2014(ESMA/2014/549), p. 225.
The Commission noted that the risks to competition and efficiency for post-trade publication were not considered as acute as for pre-trade transparency publication (Commission, Regulation Background Note MiFID I, January 2006, p. 10) and N. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, Oxford EC Law Library, 2008, p. 828.
The general MiFID I post-trade transparency obligations were laid down in the MiFID I Directive. The MiFID I Directive required RMs and MTFs to make public ‘at least’: (1) the price; (2) volume; and (3) time of the transactions concluded through their systems1 in relation to shares admitted to trading on an RM.2 The term ‘at least’ indicated minimum harmonisation. Member States were permitted to require RMs and MTFs to publish more post-trade information than prescribed by the MiFID I-regime.3 MiFID I applied the post-trade transparency obligations without calibration to the underlying trading model, such as whether the RM or MTF was order-driven or quote-driven. This contrasted with the MiFID I pre-trade transparency regime. The MiFID I pre-trade transparency regime adapted the pre-trade transparency obligations depending on the underlying trading model. MiFID I did not deem calibration in the context of post-trade transparency necessary.4 MiFID I did not require RMs and MTFs to make public the identity of the transacting parties. MiFID I ‘merely’ required the publication of the market identifier code (MIC) of the trading venue in question, being the MIC of the RM or MTF.5
The foregoing indicates that, despite the minimum harmonised nature of the general MiFID I post-trade transparency obligation, MiFID I introduced substantially higher post-trade transparency obligations compared to the ISD.6