Einde inhoudsopgave
De bevrijdende verjaring (R&P nr. 162) 2008/16.2.1
16.2.1 De tekst van de Duitse en de Engelse bepaling
mr. J.L. Smeehuijzen, datum 22-04-2008
- Datum
22-04-2008
- Auteur
mr. J.L. Smeehuijzen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS364099:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Verbintenissenrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Appendix A bij Law Commission (2001).
'5.— (1) For the purposes of this Act, a relevant body shall be treated as knowledge etc. having knowledge of a fact (a) if a qualifying individual has knowledge of that fact, or (b) if the relevant body is treated as having knowledge of that fact by virtue of section 4(3). (2) In this section 'relevant body' means (a) a body corporate, (b) a corporation sole, (c) a partnership, or (d) a body of persons which does not fall within paragraph (a) or (c) but which is capable of suing and being sued in its own name. (3) In this section 'qualifying individual', in relation to a relevant body, means an individual (a) who is an officer of the body or has authority on behalf of the body to take decisions about the cause of action concemed (or is one of a number of individuals who together have such authority), Or (b) who is an employee of the body and is under a duty to communicate any fact relevant to the cause of action concemed to any other employee of the body or to an individual falling within paragraph (a), but does not include an individual falling within subsection (4). (4) An individual falls within this subsection if he is an individual (a) against whom the cause of action concemed subsists, or (b) who has dishonestly concealed any fact relevant to the cause of action concemed from any other individual falling within subsection (3)(a) or (b). (5) Sections 4(4) and 26(6) shall apply for the purposes of this section as they apply for the purposes of those sections. (6) In this section 'officer' includes a partner.'
Zoals hiervoor werd beschreven, kent Duitsland niet ons systeem van bijzondere termijnen, maar één algemene subjectieve termijn van drie jaar. Over zijn aanvangsmoment is in § 199BGB het volgende bepaald:
"(1) Die regelmäßige Verjährungsfrist beginnt mit dem Schluss des Jahres, in dem
der Anspruch entstanden ist und
der Gläubiger von den den Anspruch begründenden Umständen und der Person des Schuldners Kenntnis erlangt oder ohne grobe Fahrlässigkeit erlangen müsste."
Ook in het voorstel van de Law Commission is, zoals wij al zagen, sprake van één algemeen geldende subjectieve termijn. In de Draft Ball1 is het aanvangsmoment van de subjectieve termijn als volgt gedefinieerd:
"1.
(1) It is a defence to a civil claim that the claim was not made before the end of the period of three years from the date of knowledge of the claimant.
(...)
2. The date of knowledge
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section and this Act, any reference in this Act to a person' s date of knowledge is a reference to the date on which he first had knowledge of
the facts which give rise to the cause of action,
the identity of the defendant, and
where injury, loss or damage has occurred or a benefit has been obtained, the fact that the injury, loss, damage or benefit is significant."
Bij deze algemene definitie blijft het niet. Waarvan kennis wordt verlangd, wordt nader beschreven in de leden volgende op het evengeciteerde lid 1:
"(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in determining the date on which a person first had knowledge of the facts which give rise to a cause of action, there shall be disregarded the extent (if any) of his knowledge on any date of whether those facts would or would not, as a matter of law, give rise to a cause of action.
In the case of a cause of action in respect of a breach of duty (whether in tort, in contract or otherwise) which involves a failure to give correct advice as to the law, subsection (1) shall have effect as if it also required knowledge to be had of the fact that correct advice had not been, or may not have been, given.
In the case of a cause of action in respect of restitution based on a mistake of law, subsection (1) shall have effect as if it also required knowledge to be had of the fact that a mistake of law had been, or may have been, made."
In art. 4 wordt, onder andere met behulp van het begrip Constructive knowledge, voorts beschreven wanneer de crediteur de vereiste kennis geacht moet worden te hebben:
4.— (1) For the purposes of this Act, a person' s knowledge includes Constructive knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire
from facts observable or ascertainable by him, or
where he has acted unreasonably in not seeking appropriate expert advice, from facts ascertainable by him with the help of such advice.
(2) In determining for the purposes of this section
the knowledge which a person might reasonably have been expected to acquire, or
whether a person has acted unreasonably in not seeking appropriate expert advice, his circumstances and abilities (so far as relevant) shall be taken into account.
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be treated as having knowledge of a fact if an agent of his
who is under a duty to communicate that fact to him, or
who has authority to take decisions about the cause of action concerned, has actual knowledge of that fact; but except as so provided a person shall not treated as having knowledge of a fact merely because an agent of his has knowledge of the fact.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a person has authority to take decisions about a cause of action if he has authority
to seek legal advice in connection with the making of a civil claim in respect of the cause of action, or
to take decisions about whether to make such a claim.
Nader bepaald wordt vervolgens in art. 5 ook nog wanneer een juridische entiteit niet zijnde natuurlijke persoon de vereiste kennis heeft — die bepaling is kortheidshalve
in de voetnoot geciteerd.2 Naast het begrip knowledge wordt overigens ook het begrip significant uit art. 2 lid 1 sub c verder uitgewerkt:
"(5) For the purposes of this section, a person ("A") shall be regarded as having knowledge of the fact that any injury, loss, damage or benefit is significant
if he has knowledge of the full extent of the injury, loss, damage or benefit, or
if a reasonable person with A's knowledge of the extent of the injury, loss, damage or benefit would think, on the assumption that the defendant did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment, that a civil claim was worth making in respect of the injury, loss, damage or benefit."