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The One-Tier Board (IVOR nr. 85) 2012/2.2.4
2.2.4 Who are the shareholders and what is their influence?
Mr. W.J.L. Calkoen, datum 16-02-2012
- Datum
16-02-2012
- Auteur
Mr. W.J.L. Calkoen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS600692:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Goyder (2008/B), p. 5; Charkham (2005), p. 307; and Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 85.
Cadbury (2002), p. 9.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 93.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 88 and 92 and Sir Bryan Nicholson, 'The Role of the Regulator', in Ken Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (2008), p. 117.
Goyder (2008/A), p. 6 and Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 93 and pp. 98-99.
Higgs Review, paras. 5.3, 5.7, 7.4 and 7.5.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 84, the SID has a role in evaluating the chairman and in the succession of the chairman and replacing the chairman in a crisis. There is some resemblance to the US 'lead' director. This is discussed fhrther below.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 91-92.
Section 168 of the Companies Act 2006 gives the majority of the general meeting the right at any moment to remove a director, but this power to remove is rarely used in a general meeting because it is cumbersome, it is used to exert power to demand accountability. Now in FTSE 350 companies all directors are up for re-election each year.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 86.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 87.
Mark Goyder and Harlan Zimmerman, Tomorrow's Company, Tomorrow's Corporate Governance: Bridging the UK Gap through Swedish Style Nominations Committees (March 2010) ('Goyder and Zimmerman (2010)').
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 86-89.
Information received orally from Hermes.
Section 438 of the Companies Act 2006 and Devies (2008), p. 385.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 88-89.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 88-89.
Devies (2008), pp. 16-17. Listing Rules: LR 10.1.2 and LR 10.5.1, see allo advice of Advocate General L. Timmerman to the ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank case, HR 13-07-2007, NJ 2007, 434, nos. 3.31 and 3.32.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 90-92.
Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 86-92. Shareholder bodies that play an important role are the Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC), which codified best practice principles for shareholders in a statement, the Association of British Insurers (ABI), the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Institutional Voting Information Service (NIS), Research Recommendations Electronic Voting (RREV), the Investment Management Association (IMA) and the Association of Investment Companies (AIC).
The fragmented share ownership of the inter-war period has been replaced by a concentrated form of share ownership as an increasing proportion of shares have come to be owned by institutions. Individuals held over half of UK shares in 1963. Today they hold one eighth. UK pension funds have become particularly dominant by as early as 1970. Around 75-80% of shares of British companies are now held by institutions, with pension funds alone owning about 30%.1
This change in the pattere of share ownership in favour of investing institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies, has encouraged those institutions to use their influence based on the number of their votes. This has increased shareholder influence in general.
Boards cannot disregard the views of important shareholders, especially if there is some degree of consensus between them.
Institutional investors now have powerful incentives to use their influence to improve the performance of their portfolios. Their holdings are collectively so large, selling has become difficult since this would influence the market. "Get out" is giving way to "influence". These institutions take a fairly long-term view of their investments. Few UK companies have dominant shareholders with more than, say 25%, ownership, which is also the case in the US, Japan and The Netherlands. There is therefore an incentive for institutional shareholders to "persuade" each other and to create strong voting blocks when particular matters are put to a vote.2 The key lever that shareholders control is their ability to vote at general meetings, but the practice is that "persuasion" takes place first and then "pressure" to avoid cumbersome general meetings.3
The most recent development is that more and more foreign institutions, particularly from the US, hold UK shares. There is a tradition of good "oneon-one" communication with large shareholders.4 However, this is less easy with foreign shareholders. What the role of hedge funds and of shareholder activists is going to be remains to be seen. Some of them are well-inforrned about companies in which they take stakes and can engage effectively with management. Some of them recognize, too, that corporate governance is connected to value. For example: a better board structure can increase shareholder prices.5
British institutional investors, increasingly via voting associations, have influenced corporate governance in various ways, generally by "pressure" and "persuasion":
(a) Separate chairman
After the Higgs Review of 2003 on the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman and the introduction of the senior independent director (SID)6 institutional investors have taken a strong stance and pressed for the proposed reforms in many companies.7
(b) Get the most out of non-executives
Institutional investors in the same way as outside directors, want to be included actively in strategie decisions and risk management. This is clear from their support of the Codes of Best Practices.8
(c) Appoint and dismiss directors
In the UK it is crucial for shareholders to have the power onder company law to appoint and dismiss directors.9 In practice it is quite rare in the UK for shareholders to propose individuals as candidates for a particular board.
This normally happens only after a company has run into trouble. Even then there is reluctance to usurp the nomination committee's right to select.
Directors representing institutional investors often use indirect pressure to influence the nomination committee, which also sounds out shareholders. In general, shareholders have pushed for the introduction of a senior independent Director to whom they can communicate any comments on the functioning of the Chairman and the CEO.
In 2004 influential shareholders of Sainsbury had made clear before the shareholders' meeting that they were going to reject Sir Ian Prosser, the candidate of the nomination committee, as chairman. Sainsbury had been losing ground to Tesco. Sir Ian had experience in leading a retail company. However, City institutions made it plain they did not feel Sir Ian had the right touch to guide the company out of troubles. Sir Ian gracefully withdrew. The nomination committee consulted shareholders and nominated Sir Philip Hampton, who had financial City experience, complementing the skins of Justin King, Sainsbury's CEO.
Similarly, Michael Green was forced to withdraw in 2003 as chairman of ITV as a result of shareholder's desire for a properly independent chairman, and Sir Peter Burt, again a figure familiar with the City, was chosen.10
There have been instances where shareholders' representations have influenced the board not to let the chief executive become chairman. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) held ground-breaking discussions with Barclays over its proposal to appoint Matt Barrett, its former CEO, as chairman in 2004. It may have influenced the bank's decision to change its plan and look outside for its subsequent chairman, Marcus Agius. Similarly HSBC went out of its way to consult shareholders on its proposal to appoint its CEO, Stephen Green, as chairman in 2006. Discussions with shareholders led to the appointment of a new CEO at Morrison, the supermarket concern, in 2006. Directors have grumbled about the need for these discussions, but it has created fewer situations of unfettered power in the hands of one person.11
Now there is discussion about possibly including one or two shareholder representatives on the nomination committee, which is otherwise composed of non-executive directors.12
(d) Remuneration policy
Shareholders also play a role in establishing remuneration structure policy. The ABI, representing shareholders, now receives over 200 requests a year from companies seeking shareholder views on remuneration policy. This has led to less extreme short-term option schemes than in the US.13
CEOs and/or chairmen of companies hold many one-on-one meetings with influential shareholders. Hermes, an influential UK pension fund, for example, always divides its one-on-one meetings as a shareholder with CEOs and/or chairmen into three parts: one-third strategy, one-third remuneration and one-third succession.14
Companies are now15 obliged to offer shareholders an advisory vote on their remuneration report. As before, a separate binding vote is required on share incentive schemes that are dilutive and/or involve the issue of shares to directors. The press watches votes on remuneration closely, and companies are concerned about the loss of reputation that may flow from evidence of widespread opposition to their remuneration policy. Moreover, a public dispute over remuneration can seriously demotivate directors. For these reasons companies increasingly seek dialogue with shareholders in order to soit out problems before they arise.16
There are three reasons why shareholders have become involved with remuneration. First, a conflict of interest arises when boards have the task of deciding on the remuneration of directors who sit on these same boards. Shareholders have a responsibility to help mitigate this effect. Second, remuneration creates incentives that will determine the approach taken by management in driving the company forward. Shareholders have a strong direct interest in what happens. Finally, there is a general need to preserve the integrity of the system. If lack of discipline and oversight allows companies to bestow lavish rewards on mediocrity and failure, it will no longer be possible to reward success. This will damage entrepreneurialism and inhibit wealth creation.
The efforts of shareholders over the years have met with some success, particularly with regard to the structure of remuneration. It was always possible for the UK to avoid the bonus extremes of the US, where it has become a subject of public interest and anger in the last few years.17
(e) Remuneration amounts
Shareholders have had less influence on the overall amounts of remuneration, which is being driven higher and higher. This is partly because they do not wish to get involved in setting the going rate. The ratchet effect is caused by disclosure, which aimed to have a limiting influence through public exposure, but the opposite happened.
More recently, however, shareholders are taking a stance on remuneration matters, such as in Shell Plc's annual general meeting of shareholders in London on 21 May 2009 when a remuneration proposal was voted down by 60%.
(f) Risk control
Shareholders have had an important indirect influence on better interaal control.
In 2002 the Association of British Insurers published a brief set of guidelines calling on boards to disclose in their annual report that they had considered the risks and to confirm that the risks were being managed and were manageable.
(g) Strategy
Finally, shareholders have a significant say in important strategic questions. The UK Listing Rules made by the Financial Services Authority18 give them the right to vote when a company wishes to make a substantial purchase or disposal of assets that will alter the shape of the company. This right is regarded as highly important. In practice shareholders have not used this right to bluntly block actions proposed by the board, but the mere fact that shareholders have such a right forces boards to consider in advance whether they will be able to carry their shareholders with them in any decision. This background explains why strategy and strategic decisions are extensively discussed in boards with non-executive directors at an early stage.19
Voting associations20 often give shareholders advice on how they should vote. This advice if often followed by institutions that do not wish to make costs investigating voting alternatives.