EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation: from ISD to MiFID II
Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.II.2.4.4:8.II.2.4.4 Differences with the MiFID I equity pre-trade transparency regime
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.II.2.4.4
8.II.2.4.4 Differences with the MiFID I equity pre-trade transparency regime
Documentgegevens:
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266609:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
CESR, Technical Advice on Possible Implementing Measures of MiFID I, April 2005 (CESR/05-290b), p. 65.
Reference is made to Linklaters, Response to CESR Consultation, 19 January 2005, p. 6 (available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/consultations/consultation-cesrs-draft-advice-second-set-mandates-european-commission).
CESR, Feedback Statement: MiFID I, April 2005, p. 46.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
CESR examined whether it would be appropriate and feasible to use the same ‘block regime’ (large in scale) regime for all pre- and post-trade MiFID I transparency provisions. In other words, CESR assessed the possibility of aligning the ‘large in scale’ concept for the pre- and post-trade transparency regime. An aligned approach would be consistent and simple, as it would provide similar provisions for both the large in scale-concepts for the pre- and post-trade transparency regime.1 Despite these advantages, in reflecting the criticisms of respondents that the rationale for permitting post-trade deferral (unwind positions) was completely different from the rationale for requiring exceptions to pre-trade transparency (i.e. reduce market impact and volatility),2 CESR took a different final position. Instead of a common regime for all pre- and post-trade transparency provisions, CESR suggested using the same pre-trade transparency ‘block regime’ (i.e. ‘large in scale’ concept for pre-trade transparency purposes), whilst introducing a separate post-trade transparency block regime’. Respondents strongly supported the final CESR position, provided the appropriate methodology applied.3 The latter view was apparent in the final MiFID I text. The term ‘large in scale’ had a different meaning for the post-trade transparency regime than for the pre-trade transparency regime.