Einde inhoudsopgave
Female representation at the corporate top (IVOR nr. 126) 2022/1.1
1.1 Background and research context
dr. mr. R.A. van ’t Foort-Diepeveen, datum 13-05-2022
- Datum
13-05-2022
- Auteur
dr. mr. R.A. van ’t Foort-Diepeveen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS659201:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Ondernemingsrecht / Corporate governance
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Acker, Sociologie du travail, 2009, 51(2); Blommaert & van den Brink, European Management Review, 2020, 17(3); Cross & Linehan, Women in Management Review, 2006, 21(1); Kirsch, Leadership Quarterly, 2018, 29(2); Kossek et al., Journal of Management, 2017, 43(1); Straub, Women in Management Review, 2007, 22(4); Szydło, European Law Journal, 2015, 21(1); Terjesen & Singh, Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, 83.
This includes chairpersons, non-executive directors, senior executives and employee representatives of the largest listed companies included in the blue-chip index.
EIGE, ‘Women and men in decision making. Indicator: Largest listed companies: presidents, board members and employee representatives’, 2021, eige.europa.eu.
Lückerath-Rovers, The Dutch Female Board Index 2020, 2020.
Calás & Smircich, in: Studying Organization: Theory & Method, 1999, p. 213; Calás & Smircich, in: The SAGE handbook of organization studies, 2006, p. 286; Calás et al., Academy of Management Review, 2009, 34(3); P. Irefin et al., ‘Organizational theories and analysis: A feminist perspective’, International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, 2012, 1(1), p. 71-97; Lorber, The variety of feminisms and their contributions to gender equality, 1997.
R. Tong, Feminist thought: A more comprehensive introduction, USA: Westview Press 2014, p. 34; Calás & Smircich, in: The SAGE handbook of organization studies, 2006.
Calás & Smircich, in: Studying Organization: Theory & Method, 1999; see for instance also: Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, Dutch gender and LGBT-equality policy 2013 – 2016, 2013.
See for instance Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, 83(3); Lückerath-Rovers, Journal of Management & Governance, 2013a, 17(2).
See for instance: Adams & Ferreira, Journal of financial economics, 2009, 94(2); Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, 83(3); Dezsö & Ross, Strategic Management Journal, 2012, 33; Isidro & Sobral, Journal of Business Ethics, 2015, 132(1); Kirsch, Leadership Quarterly, 2018, 29(2); Lückerath-Rovers, Journal of Management & Governance, 2013a, 17(2); C. Post & K. Byron, ‘Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta-analysis’, Academy of management Journal, 2015, 58(5), p. 1546-1571; Smith et al., Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2013, 66(2); Watson, Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association, 2014, 7(1&2).
Choudhury, European Business Law Review, 2015, 26(1); Heemskerk & Fennema, Enterprise and Society, 2014, 15(2); Kirsch, Leadership Quarterly, 2018, 29(2); T.R. Loy & H. Rupertus, ‘Institutional correlates with female board representation’, Finance Research Letters, 2018, 24, p. 238-246; Lückerath-Rovers, Journal of Management & Governance, 2013a, 17(2); Watson, Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association, 2014, 7(1&2).
Adams & Ferreira, Journal of financial economics, 2009, 94(2); Choudhury, European Business Law Review, 2015, 26(1); Heemskerk & Fennema, Enterprise and Society, 2014, 15(2); Singh & Vinnicombe, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2004, 12(4); V. Singh et al., ‘Legitimacy profiles of women directors on top French company boards’, Journal of Management Development, 2015, 34(7), p. 803-820; Szydło, European Law Journal, 2015, 21(1); Watson, Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association, 2014, 7(1&2).
I. Hideg & W. Shen, ‘Why still so few? A theoretical model of the role of benevolent sexism and career support in the continued underrepresentation of women in leadership positions’, Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 2019, 26(3), p. 287-303; C. Seierstad, ‘Beyond the business case: The need for both utility and justice rationales for increasing the share of women on boards’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2016, 24(4), p. 390-405.
Kruisinga et al., Nederlands Juristenblad, 2016, 21.
Heemskerk & Fennema, Enterprise and Society, 2014, 15(2); Kruisinga et al., Nederlands Juristenblad, 2016, 21; Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 10(5); Watson, Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association, 2014, 7(1&2).
Choudhury, European Business Law Review, 2015, 26(1); Diepeveen et al., International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2); Szydło, European Law Journal, 2015, 21(1).
See for instance Diepeveen et al., International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2); I. Radacic, ‘Gender equality jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, European Journal of International Law, 2008, 19(4), p. 841-857; M. Sepúlveda et al., Human Rights: Reference Handbook, Iceland: The Icelandic Human Rights Center and Costa Rica: University for Peace 2010; United Nations, Women’s Rights are Human Rights, 2014. See also for instance, the case law on preferential treatment in which it was found that legislation that requires that automatic priority should be given to a woman when both women and men are equally qualified was found to be discriminatory. See for instance, HvJ EG 17 October 1995, C-450/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:322 (Kalanke).
Diepeveen et al., International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2); Szydło, European Law Journal, 2015, 21(1).
Diepeveen et al., International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2).
Argyrou & Charitakis, International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2); Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 10(5).
Choudhury, European Business Law Review, 2015, 26(1).
Argyrou & Charitakis, International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2). Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 10(5).
Eagly & Karau, Psychological review, 2002, 109(3); Heemskerk & Fennema, Enterprise and Society, 2014, 15(2); Kruisinga et al., Nederlands Juristenblad, 2016, 21.
Eagly & Karau, Psychological review, 2002, 109(3); Heilman, Journal of Social Issues, 2001, 57(4); Heilman, Research in Organizational Behavior, 2012, 32.
S.C. Paustian-Underdahl, L.S. Walker & D.J. Woehr, ‘Gender and perceptions of leadership effectiveness: A meta-analysis of contextual moderators’, Journal of applied psychology, 2014, 99(6), p. 1129-1145.
Eagly & Karau, Psychological review, 2002, 109(3); Heilman, Journal of Social Issues, 2001, 57(4).
Gabaldon et al., Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2016, 24(3); Grosvold & Brammer, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2011, 19(2); Kirsch, Leadership Quarterly, 2018, 29(2); Kossek et al., Journal of Management, 2017, 43(1).
e.g. Gabaldon et al., Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2016, 24(3); Hernandez Bark et al., Sex Roles, 2014, 70(11/12); Kirsch, Leadership Quarterly, 2018, 29(2); Kossek et al., Journal of Management, 2017, 43(1).
Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 10(5); Senden & Kruisinga, Gender-balanced company boards in Europe, 2018.
Lambooy, European Company Law, 2012, 9(2).
Before the introduction of the target figure, the topic of gender diversity was already included in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code of 2008. See Lambooy, Corporate social responsibility, 2010.
van ‘t Foort-Diepeveen, European Company Law, 2021, 18(4); Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 10(5).
A target figure differs from a quota in that a target figure does not impose sanctions for non-compliance but merely sets aspirational goals for achieving a specific representation percentage. See for instance Burzynska & Contreras, PloS one, 2020, 15(8). See also Chapter 3 of this book.
van ‘t Foort-Diepeveen, European Company Law, 2021, 18(4).
van ‘t Foort-Diepeveen, European Company Law, 2021, 18(4).
R.M. de Cabo et al., ‘Do ‘soft law’ board gender quotas work? Evidence from a natural experiment’, European Management Journal, 2019, 37(5), p. 611-624.
Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 10(5); Senden & Kruisinga, Gender-balanced company boards in Europe, 2018.
Senden & Kruisinga, Gender-balanced company boards in Europe, 2018, p. 109.
Senden & Kruisinga, Gender-balanced company boards in Europe, 2018.
Choudhury, European Business Law Review, 2015, 26(1).
Argyrou & Charitakis, International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2), p. 48.
Diepeveen et al., International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2017, 12(2).
Leenders et al., Gender, Work & Organization, 2020, 27(3).
R.J. Ely et al., ‘Taking gender into account: Theory and design for women’s leadership development programs’, Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2011, 10(3), p. 474-493.
Ely & Meyerson, Research in organizational behavior, 2000a, 22; Meyerson & Kolb, Organization, 2000, 7(4); Nentwich, Gender, Work & Organization, 2006, 13(6).
Meyerson & Kolb, Organization, 2000, 7(4).
Bleijenbergh & van Engen, Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal, 2015, 34(5).
Women are underrepresented at the corporate top. It is a global phenomenon that women are in the minority in corporate top positions. This phenomenon also persists in Europe and the Netherlands.1 As of May 2021, on average 30 percent of the seats on the corporate boards2 of the largest listed companies in the European Union (EU) were occupied by women.3 In the Netherlands, women occupied 29.5 percent of the supervisory board seats and 12.4 percent of the management board seats of listed companies in 2020.4 Women’s underrepresentation at the corporate top is not a new phenomenon. Historically, ‘social arrangements’ in society, such as work, have been structured in a male-dominated way.5 Due to the male-dominated society, women have historically been subordinated and placed at a disadvantage in ‘the academy, the forum and the marketplace’.6 In the past, women were, for example, not permitted to vote, purchase goods without their husband’s consent, or work after they were married, thus rendering them economically dependent on their husbands.7 The remnants of this female subordination can still be observed today when considering the underrepresentation of women in corporate top positions.
The underrepresentation of women at the corporate top is identified as a problem in multiple academic disciplines and from various scholarly perspectives. Economic and organizational studies consider women’s underrepresentation at the corporate top to be a problem that can be explained from a business case perspective. The business case perspective justifies why companies should appoint women to the corporate top.8 Research in this discipline shows that having women at the corporate top has a (positive) effect on companies’ (financial) performance.9 However, the studies supporting the business case often provide inconclusive results concerning women’s positive contribution to the company’s (financial) performance.10 In corporate governance studies, it has been argued that having gender diverse boards brings different views and perspectives to decision-making, which enhance the process, quality and content of decision-making, and the effectiveness of board processes.11 Moreover, the exclusion of women from corporate top positions means that half of the workforce is effectively ruled out. This means that companies lose out on their human capital12 and use their talent pool poorly.13 As a result, female talent could be discouraged from even embarking upon the path leading to the corporate top.
Women’s underrepresentation at the corporate top is also a legal problem. In human rights studies, women’s underrepresentation is considered a matter of gender inequality.14 Gender equality requires that women and men have equal rights and opportunities in all aspects of life, including opportunities to access corporate top positions.15 The unequal treatment of women and men constitutes a human rights infringement, unless justified reasons can be provided for doing so.16 According to several human rights treaties, at an EU and United Nations (UN) level, women and men should be treated equally.17 For instance, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) aspire, among others, to equal treatment of women and men and to the eradication of gender discrimination. At an EU level, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the Treaty on the EU (TEU) are examples of EU primary law in which equality between women and men is prescribed.18 Within the gender equality debate, a further distinction can be made between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.19 Equality of opportunity is aimed at giving equal opportunities to women and men,20 whereas equality of outcome goes one step further by aiming for equal representation of women and men.21
Besides literature that points to the reasons why women’s underrepresentation is a problem, several academic studies explain why women’s underrepresentation occurs, or in other words: what barriers hinder women in accessing the corporate top. One of these barriers is claimed to be that there are simply not enough women in the pipeline to fill board positions.22 Another argument is that people develop stereotypical perceptions about women.23 This results in the emergence of multiple gender stereotypes about women, i.e., women are seen as being less capable than men to fulfill leadership roles and are, therefore, not selected for these positions24 and/or women are less appreciated than men when appointed to leadership positions.25 Academic literature examines several barriers to women’s progression to the top, but these barriers are often presented and examined in isolation, meaning that they are discussed separately or analyzed from the perspective of a single discipline.26 Consequently, although several multidisciplinary studies investigate the barriers identified in literature from the perspective of various academic disciplines,27 these studies do not provide a comprehensive answer to the question whether, and if so how, these barriers interrelate.
To redress the gender imbalance at the corporate top, governments and companies have implemented interventions to achieve gender equality at the corporate top. Governmental interventions consist of affirmative action measures in the form of gender quota. Several European countries have adopted mandatory gender quota. For instance, Norway, France, Belgium, Iceland and Italy have enacted such quotas with sanctions for non-compliance.28 Other countries on the other hand, such as the Netherlands and Spain, have adopted ‘softer’ measures without sanctions for non-compliance. In the Netherlands, the Dutch government adopted a target figure of 30 percent women on corporate boards. This target figure was in effect for a limited period, i.e., between 2013 and 2020.29,30 The target figure legislation did not impose sanctions for non-compliance. Companies had either to comply with the legislation or explain in their annual report why they had deviated therefrom (comply-or-explain principle).31,32 The target figure did not succeed in increasing the number of women to the required percentage.33 Moreover, this target figure only applied to large companies. Therefore, the Dutch government is currently in the process of adopting mandatory quota with sanctions for non-compliance.34 Another country with soft measures is Spain, that introduced a quota of 40 percent women on the boards of large companies without imposing sanctions for non-compliance. Research shows that the Spanish legislation also failed to generate a result in terms of meeting the required percentage of women on boards.35
The examples of the Netherlands and Spain show that softer measures, i.e., a target figure and/or a quota without sanctions for non-compliance, may not be successful in attaining a set percentage of women on corporate boards. Countries that have adopted mandatory quotas and have imposed sanctions for non-compliance therewith have proven to be more successful in increasing the number of women on boards to the quota thresholds than countries that did not set sanctions for non-compliance.36 Research shows that ‘the most stringent public regulatory and enforcement approaches have secured the quickest progress in terms of (coming close to) achieving the set target’.37 The success of mandatory government quotas seems, therefore, to be related to the type and severity of its sanction.38 However, the use of mandatory quota is also the subject of scholarly debate. For instance, it has been argued that quotas are not the best means for increasing women’s representation on corporate boards because they do not focus on changing unjust attitudes and behavior, but rather focus mainly on changing the number of women on boards.39
Gender equality can only be achieved when ‘structural and systemic barriers’ hindering (in this case mainly) women from enjoying equal opportunities are removed.40 Therefore, it is necessary that not only the numbers, but also the behavior and attitudes of people change (see also Section 1.3.1). This suggests that more or different interventions, such as organizational interventions, may be needed to achieve gender equality at the corporate top.
Indeed, research reveals that companies also have implemented organizational interventions to increase the number of women at their corporate top and to achieving gender equality.41 Examples of such organizational interventions include mentoring programs,42 leadership development programs43 and family-friendly policies.44 The literature on organizational interventions to achieve gender equality is derived from organizational change theory, which aims to bring about change in organizations, in this case regarding gender equality.45 The type of organizational interventions proposed by scholars depends on the feminist strand to which the scholars belong. This PhD research applies the liberal feminist lens. This approach will be discussed in more detail in Section 1.3.1. Despite increasing interest in research on organizational interventions aimed at achieving gender equality, no magic formula guaranteeing the success of these interventions has yet been found.46