Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.II.1.5.1
8.II.1.5.1 Goals
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266435:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Commission, Explanatory Memorandum: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on investment services and regulated markets, and amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, Council Directive 93/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC (2003/C 71 E/07) COM(2002) 625 final — 2002/0269(COD) (hereafter: Commission, Explanatory Memorandum: MiFID I Proposal, 25 March 2003(2003/C 71 E/07)), p. 78.
Another legal instrument were the introduction of harmonised ‘best execution’-obligations under MiFID I. Reference is made to ECB (European Central Bank), Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 June 2003 at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on investment services and regulated markets, 12 June 2003 (CON/2003/9), point 12.
Commission, MiFID I Proposal, 19 October 2002(COM(2002) 625 final) and recital 43 Council, MiFID I Common Position, 8 December 2003(2004/C 60 E/01).
Commission, MiFID I Proposal, 19 October 2002(COM(2002) 625 final), art. 26(3)(b) and explanatory statement European Parliament, 4 September 2003(A5-0287/2003); and recital 43 Council, MiFID I Common Position, 8 December 2003(2004/C 60 E/01).
Commission acknowledged the importance of wide availability of post-trade information during the ISD-Review. In view of the Commission, post-trade information enables the market to obtain the true level of actual transactions, as well as in supporting the ability of investors to monitor the quality of execution as performed by investment firms.1 A similar view was reflected in the high degree of equity post-trade transparency across RMs of many individual Member States under the ISD. As examined in the previous chapter, RMs often published a high degree of equity post-trade data, whether under national law or RM rulebooks (as approved under national law).
What changed from the ISD to MiFID I, however, was the (envisioned) market landscape. Whereas the ISD was characterised by concentrated trading on national RMs, MiFID I had the ambition to create a competitive market. To achieve the competitive market setting under MiFID I, the EU wanted, among other things, to abolish the optional ISD concentration-rule. Faced with potential fragmentation risks, (pre-trade and) post-trade transparency regulation became a main legal instrument for the EU in drafting MiFID I.2 The EU wanted to use post-trade transparency rules as a means to achieve the effective integration of Member State equity markets, to promote the efficiency of the overall price formation process for equity instruments, and to assist the effective operation of ‘best execution’ obligations.3 The Commission, European Parliament, and Council all believed that these considerations required a comprehensive post-trade transparency regime applicable across a wide range of order execution platforms, including RMs and MTFs.4
To summarize, from an abstract level the goal of post-trade transparency did not change from the ISD to MiFID I. Already under the ISD in the vast majority of Member States strict post-trade transparency obligations were apparent across the individual EU Member States.5 However, in view of the EU, the competitive MiFID I setting required a different use of post-trade transparency regulation. To achieve a competitive and integrated market across the Member States, more EU post-trade transparency rules were deemed required under MiFID I. The latter was apparent in the final MiFID I framework. MiFID I was far more encompassing when it came to EU post-trade transparency regulation compared to the ISD.