Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/8.II.1.4
8.II.1.4 Might RMs and MTFs publish post-trade data beyond MiFID I?
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266651:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
CESR, Feedback Statement: Technical Advice on Level 2 Implementing Measures on mandates of the first set where the deadline was extended and the second set of mandates: Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, April 2005(CESR/05-291b), p. 42. For an examination of the reasoning in the context of the MiFID I equity pre-trade transparency regime, reference is made to chapter 3 (section II).
Recital 44 MiFID I Directive.
Recital 44 MiFID I Directive.
This argumentation is based on D. Busch, The Private Law Effect of MiFID: the Genil Case and Beyond, De Gruyter, 2017, p. 84-85.
A question is whether RMs and MTFs were permitted to publish more and/or faster equity post-trade data than MiFID I prescribed, that is – be stricter than MiFID I? A similar question arose in the context of the MiFID I equity pre-trade transparency regime. CESR advised ‘a minimum level of pre-trade information’ to be made available under MiFID I.1 It seems likely that a similar reasoning applied for post-trade transparency under MiFID I. In effect, MiFID I permitted RMs and MTFs to publish post-trade data beyond the MiFID I standards, such as more and/or faster data. Such a reading would also correspond with the MiFID I goals. Main objectives of MiFID I were investor protection and the ‘smooth operation of securities markets’.2 MiFID I stated that transparency about trades was necessary to achieve these objectives.3 As a consequence, if an RM or MTF wanted to publish more and/or faster equity post-trade data than MiFID I prescribed, there could be little objection to this.4