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Cross-border Enforcement of Listed Companies' Duties to Inform (IVOR nr. 87) 2012/6.4.3.2
6.4.3.2 Common law tort of negligent misrepresentation
mr.drs. T.M.C. Arons, datum 07-05-2012
- Datum
07-05-2012
- Auteur
mr.drs. T.M.C. Arons
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS372031:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337.
In regard to actions for damages for negligence, the six years time limit may be extended on the basis of the regime enacted in s. 14A Limitation Act 1980. The limitation period of a three-year period starts from the earliest date on which the plaintif first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action. The knowledge required refers to both knowledge of the material facts about the damage in respect of which damages are claimed and knowledge that the damage was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, the identity of the defendant, and if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant.
[1893] 1 Q.B. 491; 9 T.L.R. 243, C.A.
Directors Liability Act 1890 (England) 53 & 54 Vict c. 64. This Act is repealed.
S. 3(1) Directors Liability Act 1890. The defendant had a statutory defence, in respect of which the burden of proof is upon him, that he had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that the statement was true or the für representation of the views of an expert or an official document. The director may allo exonerate himself from liability if he withdrew his consent to become a director of the company before the issue of the prospectus and the prospectus was issued without his authority or consent. Furthermore, the director is not liable if the prospectus was issued without his knowledge or consent, and that on becoming aware of its issue he forthwith gave reasonable public notice that it was so issued without his knowledge or consent. Or that after the issue of such prospectus and before allotment thereunder, he, on becoming aware of any untrue statement therein, withdrew his consent thereto, and caused reasonable public notice of such withdrawal and of the reason therefore, to be given. These provisions were re-enacted by s. 84(1) of the repealed Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908, s. 37 of the repealed Companies Act 1929 and s. 43(1) and (2) of the Companies Act 1948.
An expert who has given his consent to the issue of a prospectus under s. 40 Companies Act 1948, is not, by reason of that fact only, liable as a person who has authorized the issue of the prospectus either under subsection 1 or subsection 4, unless with regard to subsection 1, the statement so authorized by him contains any untrue statement. If any untrue statement is included, he is liable in damages to a person subscribing on the faith of the prospectus as a person authorizing the issue of the prospectus. The defences available to other such persons under subsection 2 are not, however available to an expert. To escape liability, he must establish one of the defences set out in subsection 3: he must prove that, having given his consent under section 40 to the issue of the prospectus, he withdrew it in writing before the delivery of a copy of the prospectus for registration; or he must prove that, after the delivery of a copy of the prospectus for registration and before allotment thereunder, he, on becoming aware of the untrue statement, withdrew his consent in writing and gave reasonable public notice of the withdrawal, and of the reason therefore; or he must prove that he was competent to make the statement and that he had reasonable grounds to believe and did up to the time of the allotment of the securities believe that the statement was true.
Re-enacted by s. 58 of the Companies Act 1985.
[1964] A.C. 465, HL.
Hudson (2008), para. 24-32.
In recent case law, there is some acceptance that regulatory standards, like the FSMA 2000 or the Prospectus Rules, co-determine thecommon law duty of care. CE Hamilton (2007) referring to Justice Havelock-Allan in Seymour v Ockwell [2005] EWHC 1137: 'I accept that whilst the ambit of the duty of care owed by a financial adviser at common law is not necessarily co-extensive with the duties owed by that adviser under the applicable regulatory regime, the regulations afford strong evidence as to what is expected of a competent adviser in most situations (see Lloyd Cheyham & Co. Ltd v Eversheds (1985) 2 F.N. 154).' (para. 77).
The consequence of this requirement is that the defendant was aware, or should have in mind, the reliance by the person (or class of persons) on his statement when he was acting.
Even though the House of Lords in Caparo adopted a more restrictive test with respect to the duty of care, it upheld in Hendersen v Merett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 145 and White v Jones [1995] 2 W.L.R. 187; [1995] 2 A.C. 207 this rule adopted in Hedley Byrne; if the defendant assumes responsibility, the necessary special relationship is given.
It is important to note that the Hedley Byme principle to establish liability in negligence was extended to negligent omissions by Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett, Stubbs and Kemp [1979] Ch. 384. For an overview of subsequent case law on negligent omissions, I refer to Clerk & Lindsell/Jones (2010b), para. 8-93.
Clerk & Lindsell/Jones (2010b), paras 8-95 — 9-96.
Clerk & Lindsell/Jones (2010b), paras 8-121.
Para. 1(e) Schedule 1 to the Unfür Contract Terms Act 1977.
Cranston (2002), p. 340; Panasar/Boecicman (2010), p. 297.
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] A.C. 728. Lord Wilberforce ruled on the basis of a two-stage test: 'First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the later — in which a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise.', pp. 751-752.
JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom and Co. [1983] 1 All ER 583 (CA); Twomax Ltd v Dickson, McFarlane & Robinson [1983] S.L.T. 98.
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman and Others [1990] 1 All ER 568, HL.
Notice that the House of Lords adopted in Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 831 at 864H a three-stage test which was reformulated in Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Price Waterhouse (No. 2) [1998] P.N.L.R. 564 at 584, which requires an affirmative answer to the following three questions: (a) Was it reasonably foreseen that the claimant would suffer the kind of damage which occurred?; (b) Was there sufficient proximity between the parties?; (c) Was it just and reasonable that the defendant should owe a duty of care of the scope asserted by the claimant?
This incremental approach was reiterated in Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 A.C. 398.
Lord Oliver in Caparo: 'What can be deduced from the Hedley Byme case, therefore, is that the necessary relationship between the maker of a statement or giver of advice —>
Commissioners for Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc [2005] 1 Lloyd's rep. 165.
Hamilton (2007).
Among others based on the statutory provision in the repealed Companies Act 1985 about the auditor's task vis-à-vis the company and its shareholders. The purpose of the audit report is to enable the shareholders to hold the director's of the company accountable for their management of the company.
Per Lord Bridge of Harwich.
Critical on this case law in regard to auditor liability: Comthwaite (1992), p. 418: 'A company's accounts clearly form an integral and important part of the relationship between the company and third parties'.
See: section 6.5.3.
This would be different if the securities issue is restricted to a particular class of investors, then it cannot be said that the prospectus was addressed to the general investor community. See: Lord Griffiths in Smith v Eric S. Bush [1989] 2 All ER 514, 536: accounts cannot be relied upon unless the claimants belong to the class of persons for whom the statements were specifically prepared for.
In Caparo, it was held that the auditor's duty is to verify in the interest of the shareholders that the accounts give a true and für view of the company's financial position. An auditor owes no duty of care towards current shareholders and other investors that rely on the auditor's report when deciding about increasing their investment in that company.
Note that the test of reasonableness requires that the defendant intended the claimant to rely on the misrepresentation. If the claimant cannot prove the objective intention, he has to demonstrate that his reliance was reasonable in the circumstances of the case. In case of a professional investor, it is more difficult to prove the reasonableness of his reliance than in cases of a consumer-investor.
PR 5.5.3(2)(a) for equity shares and PR 5.5.4(2)(a) for all other securities.
PR 5.5.3(2)(b) for equity shares and PR 5.5.4(2)(b) for all other securities as person who accepts, and is stated in the prospectus as accepting, responsibility for the prospectus.
Even though the Court of Appeal ruled in Morgan Crucible Co Plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] B.C.C. 82 that where directors of the target company intended the bidder to rely on pre-bid financial statements and profit forecasts, and where they in fact did so, there was a relationship of sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of care, the claimants have to prove personal negligence against each of them. Even if the director owed the duty of care alleged, and even if the accounts or the profit forecast were highly misleading, it would not necessarily follow that he was in breach of that duty; this might partly depend on what advice he took and what advice he followed. It is not suggested that any of the defendants should be treated as if they had warranted the accuracy of the profit forecast or the financial statements. All that is suggested is that they should not have published or circulated the representations made in these documents without due care. In Partco Group Ltd v Wragg [2004]. B.C.C. 782, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Justice Leveson was right when he held that the decision in Morgan could not be regarded as establishing that the mere supply of information by directors in the course of a takeover pursuant to the provisions of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Listing Rules could, without some additional indication of assumed personal responsibility for the supply of information, be sufficient to found liability to an action for common law negligence at the suit of the bidding company. At the same time, it seemed clear that, in relation to an assertion that by words or conduct a director has undertaken a personal assumption of responsibility for the giving or accuracy of particular information, the definition and extent of the obligations imposed on him under the statutory regime should be highly relevant in assessing the nature and extent of any responsibility undertaken. In Williams v Natural Life Health Foods [1998] 1 W.L.R. 830, the House of Lords held that in determining whether there had in law been an assumption of responsibility an objective test was to be applied. The fact that the brochure given to the claimants had held the company out as having the expertise to provide reliable advice to prospective franchisees and had made it clear that that expertise derived from the director's experience in the trade was insufficient to render him personally liable.
Al-Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Longcrofl [1990] All ER 321.
Possfund Custodian Trustee v Diamond [1996] 2 All ER 774; 1 W.L.R. 1, 351.
Hudson (2008), para. 24-34.
Hudson (2008), para. 24-56; Davies (2008), para. 25-37.
Recital 1 TD; Art. 6 TD on interim (six-month) management statement on the financial position and performance of the issuer.
In Derry v Peek,1 the House of Lords held that in the absence of a breach of a fiduciary duty or contractual duty, the defendant commits a tort only if he had made a statement which he knew to be untrue. The defendant commits a tort as well if the defendant had acted recklessly as to the truth of his statement, i.e. he had made the statement not caring if the statement was true or false.2 In Le Lievre v Gould,3 the court decided that the tort of negligence did not apply in principle to negligent misstatements causing pure economic loss.
As already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, common law jurisdictions are very reluctant to award damages for negligent misstatements causing pure economic loss apart from any contractual or fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship was originally developed for the relationship between the beneficiary and the trustee. However, certain categories of relationships of trust and confidence have been qualified in equity as a constructive trust such that the rules on fiduciary relationship apply to these relationships as well. Therefore, the trustee owes a similar duty of care towards the beneficiary.
I will now give a brief historical overview of the legislation passed by Parliament in order to redress the ruling in Le Lievre v Gould. Under the Directors Liability Act 1890,4 directors, promoters and persons authorising the issue of a prospectus (or notice) are liable to pay compensation to all persons who subscribe for securities on the faith of this prospectus for the loss those persons sustained by reason of any untrue statement in the prospectus. These persons are liable even if their belief in the truth of the statement was honestly held but that belief had been arrived at carelessly (negligently).5
The repealed Companies Act 1948 supplemented these previous statutory provisions in three relevant cases:
First, section 38 provided that it should be unlawful to make an invitation to the public to subscribe for shares without issuing a prospectus containing information as specified in that section;
Secondly, section 43(3) added experts such as valuers and accountants, who consented to the use of their reports in the prospectus to the class of those liable in respect of an untrue statement purporting to be made by him as an expert to persons subscribing on the faith of the prospectus6 ;
Thirdly, section 45(1)7 introduced the provision whereby the protection previously afforded to subscribers was extended to cover the loophole that might otherwise exist where shares were first allotted to an issuing house, for example a bank, for sale to the public. The offer for sale of the securities was statutorily deemed to be an offer for subscription.
Hedley Byrne case
As already noted in the introduction of this subsection, common law for a long time did not recognise liability for negligent misstatements. In Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd,8the House of Lords ruled that in common law there was no longer, in principle, a rule against liability in negligence for pure economie loss apart from any contractual or fiduciary relationship. In order to obtain damages based on the tort of negligent misrepresentation, the claimant must establish that the defendant owed him a duty of care not to cause losses of the kind caused by the breach of that duty.9 The defendant will only be held liable if he failed to take reasonable care and skill, to be determined by reference to members of the particular profession.10 The defendant can defend himself by presenting evidence that he followed a detailed verification procedure with respect to the prospectus contents.
The law imposes a duty of care, if the claimant can prove the following elements:
The defendant acts negligently or makes a negligent statement;
There exists a special relationship11 between the claimant and the defendant from which the defendant's duty of care arises;
The defendant breached his duty of care towards the claimant;
A causal relationship between the breach of duty and the losses incurred by the claimant.
In any case, the defendant owes a duty of care and is liable towards the claimant if it can be established that the defendant has assumed responsibility to perform a task in question for the claimant.12
In Hedley Byrne, the claimants, who were advertising agents, asked their bankers to inquire into the financial stability of a company with whom the advertising agents were planning to contract. The claimants' bankers made enquiries at the defendants who were the company's bankers. The defendants gave favourable references but stipulated that these were "without responsibility". In reliance on these references, the claimants contracted with the company which resulted in a loss. The claimants brought an action for damages in negligence against the company's bankers.
The House of Lords restricted the class of potential claimants to those shown to have relied upon the correctness of the statements13 made. The House of Lords dismissed the claim, because of the aforementioned express disclaimer of responsibility there could not be in any event a duty of care. It must be emphasised that the basis to establish liability in negligence is the assumption of responsibility by the defendant. The responsibility is not being imposed by law but undertaken voluntarily by the defendant.14 For these reasons, a disclaimer of liability in respect of a statement or service may be sufficient to preclude any finding of an assumption of responsibility and reasonable reliance.15
As a consequence, the lead manager and/or the other sponsoring banks may be able to prevent being held liable for an untrue or misleading prospectus, if they include a disclaimer in the prospectus that they cannot be held liable for any false or misleading statements in the prospectus. Such a disclaimer could fall onder section 2(2) of the Unfür Contract Terras Act 1977 and for that reason, it might be disregarded by the court if the exclusion or restriction of the lead manager's and/or other sponsoring bank's liability for negligence does not satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. However, Schedule 1 to the Unfür Contract Terras Act 1977 excludes its application to any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities or of any right or interest in securities.16 Therefore, the lead manager's disclaimer will be effective against a consumer-investor bringing a claim against the lead manager for breach of a duty of care, i.e. negligent misrepresentation, owed to him, especially in case the lead manager was extensively involved in drawing up the prospectus.17 However, in cases of fraud, the courts will disregard such disclaimers.
Caparo case
The application of the Hedley Byrne test by the English courts in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s led to a widening of the range of circumstances in which economie loss could be recovered. The House of Lords relied on the concept of reasonable foreseeability to determine the existence of a duty of care.18 If the defendant could reasonably foresee that his negligent behaviour would cause losses to the claimant, the defendant's duty of care is established. The lower English courts applied the test of reasonable foreseeability in claims against accountants and auditors based on alleged inaccuracies in accounts.19
In Caparo,20 the House of Lords sought to restrict the seemingly unlimited expansion of liability in negligence to existing categories of claims and forms of tort. It adopted a three-stage test that must be met in order to impose a duty of care on the defendant.
First of all, the losses incurred by the claimant must have been foreseeable;
Secondly, the House of Lords emphasised the importance of sufficient proximity; there has to be a special relationship (closeness and directness of the relationship) between the defendant and the claimant from which the duty of care arises. The scope of the duty of care is determined by this special relationship: did the defendant have a legal duty to take into account the reliance on his statement by this particular (class of) claimant(s).
Thirdly, the imposition of a duty of care must be für, just and reasonable.21
Furthermore, the House of Lords adopted an incremental approach with respect to the extension of duties of care; new categories of cases in which a duty of care may be held to exist should be developed by analogy with existing established categories.22
The requirement of sufficient proximity is of utmost importance to establish liability for negligent misstatements. Whether proximity exists depends on three crucial factors:
the purpose for which the statement was made;
the defendant's knowledge that his statement is communicated to the claimant;
the reliance by the claimant on the statement.23
In the recent case Commissioners for Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc,24 the Court of Appeal held that it is helpful to apply in turn all of the abovementioned tests, bearing in mind that the Courts have taken a more cautious approach to imposing a duty of care where pure economie loss is claimed without physical damage to property and taking consideration of the dominant legal policy in determining whether the law recognises a duty of care. Finally, the crucial question is whether it is für, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care; legal scholars suggest courts should look at applicable regulatory standards, as policy considerations, in determining the existence of a duty of care owed by professionals in the financial sector.25
In the Caparo case, the claimants relied on the annual accounts of a company when they acquired shares in that company. The third defendant was the auditor who performed an inquiry into the company's annual accounts. The House of Lords ruled that the auditor owes a duty of care towards shareholders of the company as a body26 and not towards any other investing member of the public because there was not sufficient proximity between the parties. The House of Lords made a distinction between reliance by a shareholder on the auditor's report which negligently undervalued the company's assets with the result that the shareholder lost part of the value of his existing holding of shares even before he decided to sell his shares at the lower market price and losses allegedly suffered from the purchase of overvalued shares. The House of Lords:
`Assuming without deciding that a claim by a shareholder to recover a loss suffered by selling his shares at an undervalue attributable to an undervaluation of the company's assets in the auditor's report could be sustained at all, it would not be reasonable on any reliance by the shareholder on the auditor's report in deciding to sen; the loss would be preferable to the depreciatory effect of the report on the market value of the shares before ever the decision of (the adviser) and the recipient who acts in reliance on it (the advisee) may typically be held to exist where (1) the advice is required for a purpose, whether particularly specified or generally described, which is made known, either actually or inferentially, to the adviser at the time when the advice is given, (2) the adviser knows, either actually or inferentially, that his advice win be communicated to the advisee, actually or as a member of an ascertained class, in order that it should be used by the advisee for that purpose, (3) it is known, actually or inferentially, that the advice so communicated is likely to be acted upon by the advisee for that purpose without independent inquiry and (4) it is so acted on by the advisee to his detriment. That is not, of course, to suggest that these conditions are either conclusive or exclusive, but merely that the actual decision in the case does not warrant any broader propositions.' See also Lord Bridge and Lord Jauncey the shareholder to sell was taken. A claim to recoup a loss alleged to flow from the purchase of overvalued shares, on the other hand, can only be sustained on the basis of the purchaser's reliance on the report. The specious equation of `investment decision' to sell or to buy as giving rise to parallel claims thus appears to me to be untenable. Moreover, the loss in the case of the sale would be of a loss of part of the value of the shareholder's existing holding, which, assuming a duty of care owed to individual shareholders, it might be sensibly lie within the scope of the auditor's duty to protect. A loss, on the other hand, resulting from the purchase of additional shares would result from a wholly independent transaction having no connection with the existing shareholding.'27
Thus, the House of Lords upheld that a sale of shares held by a shareholder in a company on the basis of an auditor's report falls within the auditor's duty of care whereas the acquisition of additional shares on the basis of the same report does not fall within the auditor's duty of care.28
Caparo test applied to negligent information in prospectus
foreseeability of losses: the issuer and its directors can reasonably foresee that false or misleading information in a prospectus can cause losses to investors;
proximity:
purpose: the issuer and its directors (and the lead manager and the other sponsoring banks for their statements in the prospectus on their respective inquiries29) want the investing public to acquire their company's securities. The prospectus is specifically directed to the general investor community.30 The prospectus is an information document about the company and its prospects that the investor can rely on when he makes his investment decision.;31
knowledge: the issuer and its directors have, or should have, the investing public in mind when they draw up the prospectus.;
reasonable reliance: it depends on whether the claimant can prove that he in fact relied on the information in the prospectus when he made his investment decision.;
duty of care is für, just and reasonable: proximity: the fact that the issuer and its directors want the market participants to invest in their securities, it is für, just and reasonable that they owe a duty of care for the information provided in prospectus.;32
liability for negligent misstatements is not a new category for liability.
On the basis of the aforementioned criteria, we can reasonably assume that the issuer as well as its directors can be held liable for tort of negligence with respect to misrepresentations in the prospectus. The duty of care follows from the special relationship between the issuer and its directors and the general investor community. Therefore, the issuer and its directors have, or should have, the reasonable general investor in mind when they draw up the prospectus. Furthermore, it can be argued that on the basis of the FSA Prospectus Rules, the issuer33 and its directors34 assumed responsibility for the information in the prospectus. However, the mere supply of information by directors is not sufficient to establish an assumption of responsibility onder the common law; some additional indications for this assumption have to be present.35 The difficulty for the claimant to obtain damages is to prove that he in fact relied on the information in the prospectus when he made his investment decision.
Al-Nakib Investments v Longcrofi case
In Al-Nakib Investments v Longcrofi,36 the court strictly applied the Caparo test to determine the scope of the duty of care. In this case, a prospectus was issued by a public limited company to invite subscriptions for shares in its subsidiary company. Shortly afterwards, the directors of the parent company, in a letter accompanied by the prospectus, announced to its shareholders a rights issue entitling them to subscribe for one share in the subsidiary for every five held in the parent company, in association with an offer of shares in the parent on a similar basis.
The court held that in relation to a statement a duty of care giving rise to liability for economie loss would only arise if the maker of the statement was aware, or ought to have known, that the recipient would rely upon it for the specific purpose of entering into a particular transaction. Accordingly, the court held that since the prospectus had been issued specifically to enable shareholders to consider the rights offer, the duty of care owed to the claimants by the defendants for that purpose did not extend to a situation where reliance was placed on the prospectus for the purpose of buying shares in the open securities market.
The first claimant, which was a shareholder in the parent company, took up the rights offer and acquired further shares in the subsequent market transactions. Compensation for the losses incurred due to untrue or misleading statements in the prospectus in the latter transactions cannot be claimed from the defendants, because they owed no duty of care to the claimants. The prospectus was not directed to purchasers in the secondary market and therefore the defendant cannot be held liable on the tort of negligence for misrepresentations therein. After the publication of interim reports by the parent on behalf of the subsidiary, the first and second claimants acquired additional shares in the market. The defendants owed no duty of care towards the claimants for misleading statements in the interim reports, because the court held that also the interim reports had been addressed to the claimants with respect to the rights offer transaction.
Possfund v Diamond case
By reference to the existing liability in tort for negligent misrepresentation as established in Hedley Byrne, Justice Lightman ruled in Possfund v Diamond37as follows:
`It is clearly established (and indeed common ground on these applications) that in a case such as the present, where the defendants have put a document into more or less general circulation and there is no special relationship between the alleged plaintiffs and the defendants, foreseeability by the defendants that the plaintiffs would rely on the prospectus for the purposes of deciding whether to make after-market purchases is not sufficient to impose upon the defendant a duty of care in such a situation requires a closer relationship between the representor and representee, and its imposition must be für, just and reasonable.'
Justice Lightman also ruled that it was arguable that persons responsible for the issue of a modern prospectus owed a duty of care to purchasers in the aftermarket. Furthermore, the court ruled that whether the defendant were to be taken to have assumed a duty of care towards any particular claimant or class of claimants is in all cases to be objectively established by the claimant proving either express communication to him of such intention or that he reasonably relied on the material representation and believed that the representor intended him to act upon it.
In this case the defendant, Diamond, was a director of a company that issued a prospectus in connection with the flotation of its shares on the Unlisted Securities Market. The first claimants, Possfund Custodian Trustee and Britel Fund Trustee Ltd, subscribed for the defendant's shares at the IPO and made further share purchases on the aftermarket. The second claimant, Irene Maud Parr, did only acquire shares in the aftermarket.
The claimants alleged that the prospectus materially misrepresented the company's financial position by substantially understating its liabilities, and that in fact the shares had no value. The claimants sought to recover damages for negligence against the directors, auditors and financial advisers of the company in respect of the alleged misrepresentations in the prospectus.
Furthermore, the claimants alleged that despite the Caparo-doctrine, the prospectus must be examined in the light of changed market practice and philosophy current at its date of preparation and circulation. Furthermore, they claim that there has been developed and generally recognised an additional purpose, an additional perceived intention on the part of the issuer and the other parties to a prospectus, namely to inform and encourage aftermarket purchasers, and that this is the basis for the pleaded purpose attributed by the claimants to the prospectus.
Justice Lightman accepted this argument and ruled that if the aforementioned can be established at full trial then it is at least arguable that a duty of care is assumed and owed to those investors, who, as intended, rely on the contents of the prospectus in making such purchases. As already noted, the time span between the publication of the prospectus and the transaction is a crucial factor in determining whether the claimant can prove that the false or misleading information in the prospectus was material and in fact influenced the investor's mind and upon which the investor reasonably relied when making his investment decision. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether it can be established that there is sufficient proximity between the issuer who published the prospectus and investors who acquired securities in the after-market. Even though these investors did rely on the information, the prospectus was not directed to them.38 Moreover, Lightman's ruling was not affirmed by any higher judicial authority.
The question is how to interpret the conflicting rulings in Al-Nakib and Possfund. Some English scholars, in my view, correctly argue that in the context of modern capital markets law, the persons responsible for the preparation of the prospectus owe a duty to protect the investment community at large, initial sub scribers and after-market purchasers alike, against losses incurred by investors due to false or misleading information.39
A listed issuer of securities owes a continuing duty to provide accurate, comprehensive and timely information so as to allow investors to make an informed assessment of their performance.40 If a listed issuer violates this duty, he should not be able to rely on the defence that the after-market purchaser cannot rely on the statements in the prospectus. In fact, the financial market participants were not provided with correct information and, therefore, they have necessarily to rely on the prospectus as their only source of (reliable) information.
Concluding, when representations are made to a specific person for specific purposes, it is sufficient to establish a duty of care on the part of the representator that he should have reasonably foreseen that the persons concerned would rely on his representation for the purposes in question. However, when the representations are made to the public at large or to special classes of the public, e.g. investors, it is necessary to establish proximity between the representator and the representee beyond the mere foreseeability of reliance by the representee to render it für, just and reasonable that such a duty of care can be imposed in respect of the representation. The latter requirement serves to protect the defendant against potentially far-reaching foreseen, but unintended, consequences.
On the basis of English case-law, the issuer and its directors can be held liable for misleading information in the prospectus. The lead manager, the other sponsoring banks, the accountants and auditors can also be held liable for their respective inquiries into the information provided in the prospectus. However, the claimants must prove gross negligence on the part of these persons when they made their inquiries. The latter requirement makes it difficult for investors to obtain damages from the enquirers.