12.2.2 Jurisdiction in collective proceedings

One of the impediments to recognising the declaratory judgment under the Brussels I regulation is the Jack of any provision of jurisdiction for collective proceedings under the Brussels I regulation. Despite this absence, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in its judgment in the Shell case used article 2 establishing jurisdiction at the place of the defendant's domicile and article 6 on closely connected claims, to declare the settlement agreement binding with respect to all investors domiciled in the European Union. It qualified the interested parties as defendants in the sense of article 2. The court established jurisdiction over the interested parties domiciled in the other Member States because of the close connection to the claims of interested parties domiciled in the Netherlands. This lenient interpretation of the regulation's jurisdiction rules by the Amsterdam Court allowed it to claim (more or less) EU-wide jurisdiction. However, it would be better to include a provision in the Brussels I regulation dealing with jurisdiction in collective proceedings. Unfortunately, the current proposal for reform as published by the European Commission does not contain any such clause. In my opinion, it would be best to adopt a provision in the Brussels I regulation that the courts of the Member State where the defendant company's statutory seat is situated have exclusive jurisdiction over collective action proceedings on corporate misinformation cases against this defendant. Furthermore, the courts of the Member State where the alleged tortfeasor 's statutory seat is situated have exclusive jurisdiction over collective settlement proceedings in which the settlement between the alleged tortfeasor and a representative association in regard to corporate misinformation is declared binding for all (potential) victims of the alleged tort.