Einde inhoudsopgave
Privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededingingsrecht (R&P nr. 174) 2009/7.9.1.2
7.9.1.2 Het passing-on verweer in de Verenigde Staten
mr.dr. E.J. Zippro, datum 29-09-2009
- Datum
29-09-2009
- Auteur
mr.dr. E.J. Zippro
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS581156:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Mededingingsrecht / Toezicht en handhaving
Verbintenissenrecht / Schadevergoeding
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Hanover Shoe Inc v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 392 U.S. 481, 88 S. Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968); Mobley 2003, p. 11; Bos 2003, p. 318
Zie ook Bos 2003, p. 318. Het U.S. Supreme Court maakt wel een uitzondering: 'We recognize that there might be situations - for instance, when an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged - where the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted in this case would not be present. We also recognize that where no differential can be proved between the price unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was required by law to charge, establishing damages might require a showing of loss of profits to the buyer.' Zie ook de in § 7.92.3 besproken zaak Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977).
Van Gerven 2006, p. 476.
Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977).
In de Verenigde Staten is het passing-on verweer in het algemeen uitgesloten. In Hanover Shoe Inc v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. heeft het U.S. Supreme Court geoordeeld dat een gedaagde zich niet mag verweren tegen een eis tot schadevergoeding met de stelling dat de eiser de te hoge prijs heeft doorberekend of zou hebben kunnen doorberekend aan zijn klanten.1 Het onderzoek naar de vraag hoeveel van de te hoge prijs de eiser precies heeft doorberekend of zou hebben kunnen doorberekenen aan zijn afnemers zou op ongerechtvaardigde wijze de procesvoering bemoeilijken en de effectiviteit van de private handhaving verminderen.2 Het U.S. Supreme Court overweegt:
'We are not impressed with the argument that sound laws of economics require recognizing this defense. A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, [392 U.S. 481, 493] had one act been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter dedined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense would require a convincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable.'
Het U.S. Supreme Court vervolgt:
'On the other hand, it is not unlikely that if the existence of the defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defendants will frequently seek to establish its applicability. Treble-damage actions would often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories. [392 U.S. 481, 494]'
Het U.S. Supreme Court besluit:
'In addition, if buyers are subjected to the passing-on defense, those who buy from them would also have to meet the challenge that they passed on the higher price to their customers. These ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers of single pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against them. Treble-damage actions, the importance of which the Court has many times emphasized, would be substantially reduced in effectiveness.'
In de Verenigde Staten is op federaal niveau een beroep op het passing-on verweer uitgesloten ter wille van het afschrikkende karakter van vorderingen tot verkrijging van schadevergoeding op grond van schending van het mededingingsrecht. Deterrence speelt in de VS dan ook een veel grotere rol dan in Europa, waar de compensatoire doelstelling overheerst.3
In de Verenigde Staten is het op federaal niveau alleen voor directe kopers mogelijk de overtreder van het mededingingsrecht in rechte aan te spreken. De indirecte actie (het ius standi van indirecte afnemers) is in de Verenigde Staten op federaal niveau door het U.S. Supreme Court verworpen in de uitspraak Illinois Brick.4 Zie mijn bespreking in 7.9.2.3.