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Cross-border Enforcement of Listed Companies' Duties to Inform (IVOR nr. 87) 2012/4.7.3.3
4.7.3.3 Causation and the notion of loss of chance
mr.drs. T.M.C. Arons, datum 07-05-2012
- Datum
07-05-2012
- Auteur
mr.drs. T.M.C. Arons
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS363575:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Bacache-Gibeili (2007), paras 315-319; Schiller (2009), p. 10.
Commentary by D. Schmidt to Paris Criminal Court, 12 September 2006 (Sidel); Critical to the use of the notion of loss of chance in cases of misleading positive information like in Sidel, Leclerc (2007), p. 37. Leclerc states that as a consequence of this ruling also investors that have not invested in the defendant company's securities are deprived of the possibility to make investment decisions in conditions that are not affected by the false information and should be allowed to claim damages on that basis. However, in my opinion, Leclerc seems to misinterpret the meaning of the Court's ruling in Sidel; the right to bring an action is restricted to the investors that were deprived of the possibility to make an informed investment decision with respect to the defendant's securities.
See also in this regard: Couret et al. (2008), para. 1498.
Jourdain (2006b), para. 91; Terré/Simler/Lequette (2009), para. 701. The Courts apply the same principle in cases where one contractual party violates his duty to inform the other (s. 1116 FCC on deceit): French Supreme Court (Commercial Chamber), 27 February 1996 (Vilgrain v Mary) PA 1996 (21), p. 78 with commentary from D. Martin; D. 1996 (36), p. 518 et seq. with commentary from N.P. Malaurie (full compensation awarded); Paris Court of Appeal (25th Civil Chamber), 4 July 2003 (Baracat Nasr v Morin) Bull. Joly Soc. 2003 (11) § 240, p. 1156 et seq. with commentary from J-J Daigre; RTD com. 2004, p. 326 et seq. (compensation for loss of chance).
Paris Court of Appeal (25th Chamber, Section B), 26 September 2003 (Soulier et al. v Flammarion et al.), Bull. Joly Bourse 2004 (1) § 4, p. 43 et seq. with commentary from É. Dezeuze; Bull. Joly Soc. 2004 (1), § 12, p. 84 et seq. with commentary from J.-J. Daigre; JCP E 2004 (19) with commentary from G. de Vries; Dr. et Patrimoine 2004 (131) § 3576, p. 93 et seq. with commentary from D. Poracchia; RJDA 2004 (181), p. 160 et seq.; BanqueD 2004 (93), p. 33 et seq.
Paris Criminal Court, 12 September 2006, Bull. Joly Soc. 2007 (1) § 14, p. 119 et seq. with commentary from J.-F. Barbièri; Bull. Joly Bourse 2007 (1) § 4, p. 37 et seq. with commentary from É. Dezeuze; D. 2006 (36), p. 2522 et seq. with commentary from D. Schmidt; Dethomas/ Aubert (2007).
Paris Court of Appeal (9th Chamber, Section B), 17 October 2008, Rev. soc. 2009 (1), p. 121 et seq. with commentary from J.-J. Daigre; Bull. Joly Bourse 2009 (1), § 4, p. 28 et seq. with commentary from É. Dezeuze.
Paris Court of Appeal, 14 September 2007.
The Court of Appeal's ruling was upheld by the French Supreme Court (Criminal Chamber), 31 October 2008.
It is difficult for an investor to provide evidence for his claim that he would not have acquired the securities if correct and complete information had been published in the prospectus. In that case, he needs to prove transactional causation, i.e. that he actually based his decision to acquire the securities on the information. The laffer is difficult to provide evidence for. If the investor claims that he acquired the securities on the basis of an incorrect price induced by the misinformation, it depends on the willingness of the court to confirm causation between the losses incurred by the investor and the publication of false or misleading information on the mere proof that the stock price was influenced by the misinformation. After all, the share price is influenced by many different factors and the influence of the misinformation on the share price diminishes over time.
However, the notion of loss of chance could facilitate the claimant's burden of proof1 The claimant could base his claim on the fact that he lost the opportunity to make an informed decision with respect to his investment in the defendant company's securities (atteinte à la liberté d 'arbitrer en connaissance de cause)2and that this misinformation deprived him from the opportunity to have invested differently.3 In that case, it could be sufficient to prove that the information was false and misleading and that an altemative investment opportunity would have been more profitable. However, the claimant will not receive full compensation; the court will take into account the inherent uncertainty of how the claimant would have decided if he had been informed correctly.4
In cases of corporate misinformation in a prospectus, investors claim that the misinformation deprived them of an opportunity to make a well-informed choice between an investment in the securities of the said company and an investment in other securities. If it is established that the information in the prospectus was false or misleading, it follows directly that the investors could not have made a well-informed investment decision. There is a causal relationship between the loss of a chance of making a well-informed decision and the publication of the false or misleading information even if it is not certain that the hypothetical decision based on correct information would have been different from the actual decision. In fact, the losses acclaimed for are not the losses incurred because of the acquisition of the securities of the issuer that published misinformation, but they are the losses incurred because of the lost opportunity, i.e. the possibility to make, on the basis of correct information, a different investment decision that would have been more profitable. For these reasons, there is a condicio sine qua non-connection between the publication of false or misleading information, the loss of a chance and the losses incurred. In the evaluation of the losses that can be attributed to the lost opportunity, the courts should, and do in fact, take account of the chance factor (aléa) in securities market investments. Therefore, the courts do award a partial compensation of the investor 's losses. However, as can be observed in the already mentioned case-law, French courts do not provide a rigorous analysis how they calculate the amount of damages awarded.
I will now discuss how the French courts circumvented the prescribed differential treatment of decisions to acquire or conserve the securities on the basis of misinformation. In its judgment of 26 September 2003 in the Flammarion case, the Paris Court of Appeal5 ruled in favour of compensation for losses incurred due to a loss of opportunity to sell the securities acquired before the publication of misleading information at a higher price. Even though this ruling seems contrary to the French Supreme Court's ruling in Société Générale de Fonderie on the required transactional causation between the tort committed and the losses incurred by the investor, the Paris Court of Appeal resolved this issue by application of the theory of lost opportunity. In this case, the Flammarion company published its half-year results in a financial daily magazine. Mr Soulier, shareholder of Flammarion S.A., decided to sell his shares immediately upon publication of these results. Five days later, the company announced the sale of a majority bloc of shares for a guaranteed price that was double the market price.
The court, first of all, established the tortious behaviour, i.e. publication of misinformation:
`[...] [T]he Flammarion company published deliberately, without any necessity proven, financial information that in itself is exact, however when taking into account the imminent agreement that would have a determinant effect on its stock price, even if the agreement is subject to the risk that it will not be concluded, constitutes information that in reality is inexact, at least misleading, and spreads a message that is excessively pessimistic on the perspectives of its short-term share market price development.'
Furthermore, it rejected Flammarion's argument that Soulier's losses were due to his own fault:
`[...] [Elven though the published first half-year results and the report on its activities were not of an alarming nature with respect to the perspectives of the company in the long run, given the results accounted for on a going concern basis and the supplementary explanations, they clearly showed that the results for the year 2000 were not good, such that the fall in the quoted stock price was predictable and a normal sanction of the stock market. In that way, the publication of 12 October 2000 [of the half-year results, TMCA] were of a nature to induce R. Soulier to immediately sell the shares he acquired in Flammarion in April 1999, without awaiting the future resurge in the stock price when the restructuring and integration of the company's subsidiary Casterman were realised because of its uncertainty, for these reasons the allegation by the company Flammarion of own fault has no basis.'
Secondly, it ruled that the losses incurred by the shareholder who sold his shares at a lower price, and therefore was deprived of the opportunity to sell his shares at the higher price that was offered to Flammarion's shareholders by the group company RCS five days after his own sale, were caused by publication of the inexact information. Even though the court awarded partial compensation because of the lost opportunity, in light of the circumstances, a five-day period, the chance factor plays a minor role in diminishing the difference between the actual price for which the shares were sold and the guaranteed price.
In the Sidel case, the Paris Criminal Court6 ruled that the company Sidel for many years published inexact information concerning the company's financial position. By publication of this misinformation, Sidel made investors believe that the company's actual and future situation was better than they were in reality. With respect to the private claim (action civile) for damages filed by around 700 investors, the court ruled as follows:
By this fact, investors were able to be induced on the basis of this information to acquire or keep securities whose real value was lower than the stock market price.'
In its evaluation of the losses caused by this misinformation, the court ruled that:
`In financial market cases, the fact that the private parties, [...], had sold their securities at a price that is lower than the purchase price, even in case of a violation of financial market rules [i.e. tortious behaviour, TMCA], does not in itself establish a loss. In fact, the stock market price has in itself a speculative nature. The notion of risk is a given fact that must be taken into account by the investor.' [...] 'In reality, the shareholders suffered losses as a result of the loss of a chance of acquiring or retaining a share of which the promising perspectives were manifestly overvalued. Their liberty to choose has been negatively affected and by that a direct loss was caused to them.'
In contrast to the distinction established in the Société Générale de Fonderie case, this court established transactional causation in regard to the decision to acquire as well as in regard to the decision to keep shares in Sidel and the publication of misinformation. Secondly, the court applied the loss of a chance doctrine: the direct losses incurred by the decision to acquire or to keep securities taken on the basis of the misleading or false information are the losses incurred as a result of the loss of a chance of making a more profitable transactional decision. Furthermore, the Paris Criminal Court in the Sidel case took into account the speculative character and inherent risk of investing in securities in such a manner that only partial compensation was awarded. The computation of the losses was not elegant; the court awarded, without reference to any arguments, EUR 10 per share. This Paris Criminal Court's was later affirmed by the Paris Court of Appeal.7
In the recent Regina Rubens case8 on the publication of false financial information, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that the losses incurred by these investors were 'the loss of a chance of investing their capital in another investment project that is more favourable, and the loss of a chance of withdrawing faster from the actual investment'.9 The Court awarded damages, equivalent to 10 per cent of their investment, for this loss of opportunity.