De bezoldiging van bestuurders van beursgenoteerde vennootschappen (IVOR nr. 113) 2018/443:443 Mc Quillen v. National Cash Register

De bezoldiging van bestuurders van beursgenoteerde vennootschappen (IVOR nr. 113) 2018/443

443 Mc Quillen v. National Cash Register

Documentgegevens:

mr. E.C.H.J. Lokin, datum 01-04-2018

Datum: 01-04-2018
Auteur: mr. E.C.H.J. Lokin
JCDI: JCDI:ADS367873:1
Vakgebied(en): Ondernemingsrecht / Corporate governance

In navolging van rechter Dore komt in de daaropvolgende rechtszaken steeds meer de nadruk te liggen op de terughoudendheid die een rechter dient te betrachten ten aanzien van de bezoldiging van bestuurders. De kans dat rechters daadwerkelijk zullen ingrijpen bij een excessieve bezoldiging wordt daardoor verder beperkt. Zo verwerpt de District Court van Maryland, verwoord door rechter Wiliam C. Coleman, in Mc Quillen v. National Cash Register, de vordering van aandeelhouder McQuillen et al. dat de bezoldiging van bestuurder Colonel Deeds – in het bijzonder het aan hem verleende optiepakket – aan te merken is als ‘waste’.1 Coleman benadrukt dat in een situatie als de onderhavige de hoofdregel geldt zoals weergegeven in Wight v. Heublein:

“It is obviously not the province of a court of equity to act as the general manager of a corporation or to assume the regulation of its internal affairs. If the chosen directors, without interests in conflict with the interest of stockholders, act in good faith in fixing salaries or incurring other expenses, their judgment will not ordinarily be reviewed by the courts, however unwise or mistaken it may appear; but this is far from saying that equity will refuse to redress the wrong done to a stockholder by the action or policy of directors, whether in voting themselves excessive salaries or otherwise, which operates to their own personal advantage, without any corresponding benefit to the corporation under their control.”2

Coleman komt op basis van een evaluatie tot de conclusie dat de rechtbank zich in onderhavige casus niet dient te bemoeien met de bezoldiging van de bestuurders. Ten tijde van de toekenning van de opties had bestuurder Colonel Deeds een dusdanige positie verworven binnen de industriële wereld, dat hij in staat was ‘to name his own price’. En blijkbaar waren de directors de mening toegedaan dat zijn diensten onmisbaar waren voor de toekomst van de onderneming. De rechtbank vervolgt:

“There is a good deal to justify this conclusion, but whether it be entirely sound or not is beside the sole question which this court is permitted to rule upon, that is, whether the cumulative option to purchase, […] which the directors agreed Colonel Deeds should have as supplementary to his salary of $100.000 a year, was so exorbitant as to preclude a finding of good faith and to amount to waste of the company’s assets on the part of the directors in making such an agreement.”3

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McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 27 F. Supp. 639, 650-654, May 4, (D. Md 1939). In hoger beroep wordt de uitspraak van de District Court of Maryland bekrachtigd door de Circuit Court of Appeals, zie McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, June 10, (4th Cir. 1940).

Wight v. Heublein, 4 Circuit 238 F. page 324. Zie McQuillen, 27 F. Supp. 651. Coleman verwijst tevens naar het eerder aangehaalde arrest Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., supra. Ook verwijst Coleman naar Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., supra, 189 N.W. p. 587: “If the officers, acting as they do in a fiduciary capacity, fix exorbitant and unreasonable salaries so as to absorb earnings which should go in dividends or remain with the company as surplus, they are not exercising the fidelity which the law requires and a court of equity will give relief at the suit of a minority stockholder by compelling restoration. In determining whether salaries are so excessive and unreasonable that there should be a restoration, courts proceed with some caution. An intolerable condition might result if the courts should too lightly undertake the fixing of salaries at the suit of dissatisfied stockholders. An issue as to the reasonable value of the services of officers is easily made. It is not intended that courts shall be called upon to make a yearly audit and adjust salaries. The dissenting stockholder should come into court with proof of wrongdoing or oppression, and should have more than a claim based on mere differences of opinion upon the question whether equal services could have been procured for somewhat less. Were it otherwise efficient executives, able to command in competition large salaries, risking their capital on the faith of control and a steady employment, would find themselves and their capital periled by the uncertain view which a court might take. The right of majority control must be given effect, and the minority cannot, through the courts, interfere with an honest and fair majority policy.” McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 27 F. Supp. 639, 651-652, May 4, (D. Md 1939).

McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 27 F. Supp. 639, 652, May 4, (D. Md 1939). Zie ook de passage: “What the point would be beyond which, in the present case, payments in any form might properly be said to amount to a clear abuse of the discretion vested in directors, and to amount to waste, we are not called upon to decide. Suffice it to say we are not satisfied that it has been over-stepped in the present case as a result of the option to Colonel Deeds.” McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 27 F. Supp. 639, 654, May 4, (D. Md 1939).